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IN i HE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOooo-

STAII 01 U I AH,
Phiniil'l :iiid Appellee,
Case I

vs.

^

\ \

GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Priority No. 2

This defendant has a limited I'» nivani' UMI Jaiiiagi, ,IIK1 HI L \icnsive
history of social disorders involving his community. In summary, this defendant has a
tt;iide!ii;,,l in hi, nhuoxioi is and repetition causing discomfort for those around him, In
1995, after being warned not

•

•

v unreasonable

durations any longer, the defendant was charged and convicted of retail theft for
consuming too many free refills of coffee. The defendant was placed on probation and
at the State's rniin^f im ludol <in onln picicnting the defendant from approaching and
making contact with the witnesses, court officials, ,iml menu -TS, ot thr linn f t'unty

Attorney's Office apparently due to their discomfort arround the defendant.
On February 28, 1997, the defendant allegedly approached the witness in
Albertson's grocery store and conveyed a threat to her. This appeal is the from two
proceedings. The defendant was convicted in the 1997 case by a jury for retaliation
against a witness and the judge found the defendant had violated the terms of his
probation in the 1995. The defendant believes that as a matter of law, the State failed
it's burden in both matters. The trial court lacked jurisdiction in the probation case as
the case had been closed and the State failed to prove the element of a threat to do
bodily injury in the criminal proceeding.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The appellant appeals
the final order and judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County
involving his conviction of Retaliation Against a Witness in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(A)

Probation Violation, case no. 951501084:

2

1.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error h; shitiinj.- (IK huidcu

efendant to show jurisdiction over the probationer existed.
2.

Whetb

uated probation upon payment of the $75.00

fine to the court.
3.

Whether the State proved the probationer had adequate notice of the terms

ofi

>i..n<-

(B)

Retaliation Against a Witness, case no. 971500209:
1.

-i.

Whether the State proved every element of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt and tli.il ilv Irml uunl

tmniiik'J reversible error by denying the defendant's

motion to dismiss.
2

Whether the trial court commited reversible error by not reducing, ilif

« k\t'i\v Ifoiii Retaliation Against a Witness to Harassment or Stalking. The punishment
is disproportionate *

duct is not felonious.

Whether the trial court unjustly denied tin ilcli nil;mf Imm nnuHIUL
evidence of the prior crime when the State's key witness addressed the prior arrest.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(A) (l)-(2). The trial court terminated probation upon h v* •*••
fine and the trial court lost jurisdiction over the defendant. Moreover, the State failed

3

it's burden to show that jurisdiction existed over the defendant and the trial court
unjustly placed the burden on the defendant.
A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to have the power and authority to
decide a controversy. Without subject matter jurisdiction a court cannot
proceed. See Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 n.3 (Utah App. 1990).
We review a lower court's determination of whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction under a correction of error standard. Id at 1276. [District] courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-2 (1992).
Burns Chiropractic v. Allstate Ins., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct App. 1993) ("Circuit"
changed to "District" by the defendant).
(A) (3). No evidence existed that the defendant had notice of the
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation.
The trial court's finding that Kasco was "on notice" and the noncompetition
covenant began to run in August 1988 involves a question of fact and a question
of law. Since the finding that Kasco was on notice was a question of fact, we
reverse only if we find it clearly erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). However, the effect of that notice,
which presumably led the trial court to find an anticipatory repudiation, is a
question of law which we review for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425.
Kasco Services v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992).
(B) (1) - (2). The trial Court improper determined that the State met it's
burden to prove each element of the offense charged and submitted the case to the jury.
Moreover, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to reduce the charge to a
violation of Harassment or Stalking.
[T]he 'trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.'" State
v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Ward v. Richfield City,
4

798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)). "'We accord a lower court's statutory
interpretations no particular deference but assess them for correctness, as we do
any other conclusion of law.'" Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d
443, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted)).
State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
(B)(3). The trial court unjustly prevented thr iiilnn Mhilir nt tin prim
crime upon the defendant's motion after the State's witness raised the issue of the
defendant'1. juim' ;invst.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Addendum * j

5

/. PROBATION VIOLATION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgments of the Fifth District

Court for a probation violation of a Retail Theft case (a Class C Misdemeanor), (r. at
73), because the defendant allegedly and repeatedly made contact with the convicting
witness. Evidently from review of the order in question, the defendant was prhibited
from making contact with said witness. The State prepared the order, but no evidence
in the record exists that the order was provided to the defendant, either in person or by
mail. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court denied said motion
and affirmed the violation while unjustly imposing the burden of proving jurisdiction
upon the defendant. (R. at 117-21).
//.

Course of the Proceedings:
On March 25, 1996, the defendant was convicted by bench trial of Retail

Theft, a Class C Misdemeanor, for having too many refills (r. at 172.22) at a Walmart
snack bar on November 15, 1995. (R. at 172.6). On that date, Mr. Spainhower was
apparently told he could no longer take extra cups of coffee and he couldn't stay there
for long periods of time. (R. at 172.8). The defendant testified that he was told that he

6

couldn't be there too long, he could have all the refills he wanted I mi il:i' in I nil 10
leave within a specific period of time. (R. at 172.30). Apparently, the store manager
also told Mr. Spainhow • •*

72.30). Mr

Spainhower's response was that he was just trying to be a
172.3u
questio

• il i i ci lirn

I; it

i uring the State's cross examination of Mr. Spainhower, the State raised the
clef' iitlani

t ompetency asking him if he had the ability to count from

one to six and whether he was on i

Spainhower

reported that he could count because he obtained a G.E.D., but that he was on
dis;11 1111 \

it that point the defense objected and the court conducted a bench

conference. Upor

_-».t^c. the court quickly wrapped up the case

and found the Mr. Spainhower guilty, imposed n

^

l

and

imposed a term of probation not to follow or harrass individuals involved with the case,
'in lijilii'i?, Will Is Lin uic toun, and the Iron County Attorney's Office.2 See 3-25-96
Trial Transcript exsurp, Addendum

,

Subsequently, Mr. Spainhower requests a copy of the
. . - • court prepared the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) dated March 25,
1996. «,K. at 22-23^

equently, the following day, the State prepared

the Judgment Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence
* Due to Mr. Spainhower's disability. (R. at 172.34, ?S">.
2

This term was imposed withoi it
requirement.

•• .:
7

-dcna: lo support such a

was entered April 1, 1996. (R. at 24-26)(Addendum D). No evidence exists in the
record of either orders being received by the defendant, not even through counsel.
At a subsequent review hearing, the court reviewed the case and there is a
court docket entry that the case was dismissed. (R. at 86). The defendant failed to
attend the review hearing. (R. at 86).
Nonetheless, on February 28, 1997, Mr. Spainhower was charged with
retaliation against a witness-the nature of the second appeal. Subsequently, the State
filed it's motion on March 21, 1997, seeking an Order to Show Cause for the reported
violation and subsequent charge of retaliation. Mr. Spainhower retained counsel, D.
Bruce Oliver and counsel filed his appearance on April 9, 1997. (R. at 51). On April
15, 1997, an Order to Show Cause was issued by the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the
Fifth District Court. (R. at 60); it was scheduled for 1:30 p.m. for May 6th.
At the Order to Show Cause, Mr. Spainhower denied the allegations and
an evidentiary hearing was set for June 6, 1997. (R. at 65, 68).
During the June 6th hearing, the defense moves to dismiss the matter and
the parties argue the matter. (R. at 73). The defense argues that Judge Braithwaite had
dimissed the case on April 29, 1996 and that the terms of the probation had expired.
(R. at 72). As a result, the cort required clarification, took the matter under
advisement, and ordered the parties to submit memoranda. (R. at 72). The parties did.
(See memorandum in support of dismissal (Addendum E), and in opposition

8

(Addendum F)). (R. at 84-106, 74-81). Oral arguments were set for August 4, 1997.
(R. at 83). On August 4, 1997, the trial court took the matter under advisement and
stated it would issue a written opinion. (R. at 115). On August 22, 1997, the trial court
issued it's opinion against the defendant. (R. at 117-21; Addendum G).3 An order was
prepared by the State and submitted on September 8, 1997. (R. at 126).
Thereafter, the defendant timely moved for reconsideration on September
18, 1997. (R. at 132) arguing against the trial court's belief that it was the defendant
burden to show to probation versus the State's burden to show the existent of probation.
The State responded, (r. at 152) and the motion was denied. On November 17, 1997,
the trial court conducted a review hearing. (R. at 155).

///.

Disposition in Trial Court:
At the November 17, 1997 review hearing, the trial court found that the

defendant did violate his probation, the probation was revoked and Mr. Spainhower
was ordered to serve 60 days in the County Jail. Further, the trial court required the
committment to run concurrent with the diagnostic evaluation related to the Retaliation
Against a Witness case. (R. at 155, 158-156; Addendum H). The defendant appealed.

3

Note: that up until this point, the trial court had called the offense a class C
Misdemeanor consistent with the March 25, 1996 commitment order, now as a result of
this ruling the court call's the offense a class B Misdemeanor consistent with the second
order in question entered March 26, 1996.
9

IV,

Statement of Facts:
See part III above.4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Three main issues are on appeal regarding this matter: (1) The lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court to determine a probation violation. The case had been
closed by Judge Braithwaite on April 29, 1996 by completion of the payment of his
fine. (2) The trial court improperly placed the burden of persuasion onto the
defendant to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction rather than onto
the State. In criminal and subsequent proceedings, the State maintains the burden of
determining jurisdiction. (3) The lack of notice of the April 1, 1996 order and the
obvious confusion caused between that and the March 25, 1996 order. Neither
order indicates that the defendant had notice of his probation terms and no service of
the order was accomplished, in spite of Mr. Spainhower's request for a copy of the
order. Furthermore, it is clear that the order is in error as the entire proceedings
indicated a class C misdemeanor until after the probation violation was determined by

4

The course of the proceedings are the nature of this appeal.
10

the trial court. At that point, the court began referring to the offense as a class B
misdemeanor.5

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
A. Lack of Notice; Trial Court's Own Termination of Probation Upon
Payment of Fine.
Mr. Spainhower's motion to dismiss was valid for either of two reasons.
Addendum D attached herewith is the judgment which was prepared by the Iron County
Attorney's Office and submitted to the Court. Said document was never served upon
the defendant or his counsel. This document was never approved as to form or content.
There is no certificate of mailing to anyone. The Order contains gratuitous language
which was not ordered by the court. Addendum B which is the trial transcript shows
that Mr. Spainhower specifically requested a copy of the order. The judge responded
that the defendant would receive a copy of the order after Mr. Brickey typed it up.
This never did occur, the defendant never did receive a copy of the order.
The first point which would require a dismissal of this case is that the case

5

At sentencing the offense was treated as a class Bmisdemeanor and the Utah
Board of Pardons has considered the offense as a class B misdemeanor in determining a
parole date.
11

was closed by Judge Braithwaite on April 29, 1996. This was indicated in the Docket
of this case which was attached as Exhibit 3 of the defendant's motion to dismiss. (R. at
86). The argument was raised at the time of the hearing at the Order of Show Cause.
The trial court denied the motion at that time; however, the transcript included herewith
clarified the facts of this issue. The Court on page 35, line 9 of the 3-25-96 trial
transcript stated: "It's not a big case, but it's still a violation." The Judge set a review
date in this matter of April 29, at 10:30 a.m., that was the same date the fine of $75.00
was due. The fine was paid as ordered. The judge did not specify a probationary
period. The probation period of one year was gratuitously added ex-parte by the
County Attorney's Office when they prepared the second order. The review date set by
Judge Braithwaite and contained within the order was the time within which the court
expected performance and was the date set to close the case. Judge Braithwaite
routinely sets a review dates in less important cases and upon the payment of the fines
he closes the case. This case is neither unique nor unusual in that context. Judge
Braithwaite closed this case as he would any other minor theft case under similar
circumstances. Judge Braithwaite's closing of the case should not be summarily
disregarded, when indeed it follows Judge Braithwaite's standard procedure. The
addition of the probationary period by the County Attorney's Office should not
prejudice Mr. Spainhower. To allow this to go unchecked would be a clear violation of
due process in this case. Mr. Spainhower was never adequately informed of what was

12

expected of him. Mr. Spainhower was not given notice of the court's order. Further
with the additions by the County Attorney's Office, there is significant confusion in the
obligations of Mr. Spainhower.
The second point for which this Order to Show Cause should be dismissed
is that the time had run and that the defendant's probation had terminated by operation
of law. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-1 (11) (b) provides:
The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show
cause or a warrant by the court.
Id. This provision of the Code provides that there are two different situations which
will toll the running of the probationary period. These situations are 1) when there has
been a violation report filed with the court; and 2) the issuance of an order to show
cause or warrant of arrest by the court. The first situation is a document which is
prepared and generated by Adult Parole and Probation as a result of their supervision of
the probationer. Mr. Spainhower was not supervised by the Department of Adult
Parole and Probation, nor did they file a violation report. The second method involves
the issuance of an order to show cause or a warrant of arrest. These two documents
are generated by either the court or the prosecutor's office. Utah Code Annotated
Section 77-18-1 (12 (b) provides:
(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
13

that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified,
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause it shall cause to be served on
the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
Id. This provision indicates that in order for the court to issue a warrant or order to
show cause pursuant to this provision there must first be submitted an affidavit to the
court. The code provisions require that the affidavit must allege facts with
particularity. In this case there are only general allegations contained within the
affidavit. Paragraph 4 (a) and (b) are the salient paragraphs and they are only general
in nature. Paragraph 4 (b) of the affidavit of Terry Petersen contains names not
specifically enumerated by Judge Braithwaite in court, they were requested by Mr.
Brickey, however the judge did not enumerate them. Judge Braithwaite told Mr.
Brickey to include in his order the list of names and then to provide a copy of the order
to Mr. Spainhower. The list of names was included however the list was never
provided to Mr. Spainhower.
The reference specifically to an affidavit in connection with an order to
show cause or a warrant of arrest indicates that the filing of the affidavit is not
comparable to the filing of a violation report. An affidavit is for the purpose of
allowing the judge to determine from the detailed facts whether there is probable cause
to determine whether or not an order to show cause should be issued. When this
method is employed it is the issuance of the order to show cause which tolls the running
of the probationary period. In the Affidavit of Terry Petersen he specifically requests
14

that the court issue an order to show cause directing and requiring the defendant to
appear before said court and show cause, if any he has, why the aforesaid period of
probation should not be revoked. It is clear that this affidavit was specifically prepared
and submitted in support of the issuance of an order to show cause. It is likewise
interesting that along with this affidavit was also submitted a Bench Warrant and an
Order to Show Cause. Under these circumstances it is the issuance of either of the
Bench Warrant or the Order to Show Cause which tolls the running of probation.

B. Unjust Shift of Burden to the Defendant.
In the trial court's August 21st decision, Judge Eves stated, "Apparently
at the time Judge Braithwaite entered his judgment in this case and placed the defendant
on probation, he stated that the probation was to continue for one year from March 25,
1996." This assumption by this Court is erroneous. In this matter, Judge Braithwaite
imposed a fine of $75 fine in this case and scheduled a review on April 29, 1996, at
10:30 a.m. apparently intending to close the matter. This matter had been a class C
misdemeanor offense.
The trial court further stated, "The defendant is the moving party in this
case and has the burden or [sic] establishing that his motion is well taken.6 The
6

The defendant does not concede that he has the burden as the "moving party";
rather the defendant objects on the grounds that it is the burden of the prosecutor to
demonstrate that the defendant violated his probation and/or that probation was not
terminated prior to the "would be" violation.
15

defendant has failed to demonstrate that Judge Braithwaite intended to revoke the
probation order previously entered in this case or to terminate the probation before it
had run its course." This conclusion of law is erroneous.
Contrary to the decision in this matter the defendant has met any burden
posed by the trial court to demonstrate that Mr. Spainhower's probation was terminated
prior to the filing of the March 21, 1997 violation report. At the time of oral
arguments, the defendant presented with his motion a copy of this case's docket (a
court record) that showed the case was dismissed by Judge Braithwaite well before
March 21st. As a matter of fact, Bruce Oliver had thereafter discussed with Judge
Braithwaite the Judge's policy regarding dismissals upon payment of fines.7 The Judge
indicated that upon payment of a fine the court does dismiss the matter. In this case,
that is just what occurred even though the defendant was not present at the review
hearing.
The Utah Supreme Court in In re State ex rel. Graham, 170 P.2d 172,
110 Utah 159 (1946), stated:
A presumption of regularity exists in favor of records which come to this court
for review. Deletions, interlineations and changes in the documents comprising
a record are presumed to have been made before those documents were filed and
acted upon or by proper amendments thereafter. This presumption of regularity

7

See D. Bruce Oliver's Affidavit Supporting Reconsideration dated September 18,
1997. (R. at 140-141). Mr. Oliver discussed the judge's courtroom policy regarding this
issue on or about August 19, 1997 when he was in Cedar City on another matter.
16

must exist in order to expedite the final determination of cases and to discourage
attacks on court records on merely technical grounds. The presumption is
justified by the high quality of men and women who are the judges and
commissioners and clerks who have the duty to make the records and the
responsibility of their custody. Further, to falsify court records is a felony
(Section 103-26-70, 71, U.C.A. 1943). It is reasonable to presume that those
having custody of court records and all other persons having access to those
records will not commit a crime by falsifying same.
Id. The same presumption exists in this case. The defendant properly presented this
issue to this Court and the challenge of the existence of a dismissal is the prosecution's
burden and is not left for the court to surmise.
Moreover, during the hearing, the dismissal was discussed at length with
this Court and counsel provided the Court with the transcript relevant to the issue. The
defendant requests that this Court refer back to the transcript. Clearly, upon review the
trial court should have found the burden of persuasion has been met. This contention
runs consistent with the presumption of innocense and the burden to prove guilt is on
the prosecution.
This Court has ruled on a matter with a similar arguement that Mr.
Spainhower urges in this matter. In State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah 1988), this
Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction, rebuttable presumptions, and burdens of proof
in criminal proceedings. This Court stated:
Due Process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). In criminal cases, the prosecution is often aided by procedural
devices which "require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (in the case of an
inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of
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proof with respect to the presumed or inferred fact by having satisfactorily
established other facts." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975).
Since these devices shift the burden of production or persuasion to the defendant
by requiring him or her to present some evidence contesting the otherwise
presumed or inferred fact, these devices must satisfy certain due process
requirements. IdL
!,

[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] device's
constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not
undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by
the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985) (quoting County Court v. Allen,
442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). The use of any mandatory rebuttable presumption
which "requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted" is one such evidentiary
device found to be unconstitutional. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2
(1985). See also State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v. Turner, 736
P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Both Chambers and Turner involved challenges to an identical jury instruction
taken verbatim from Utah's possession of stolen property statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1987). That statute provides that possession of property
recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation is made, should be deemed
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property. IcL The
Utah Supreme Court in Chambers and this court in Turner found that the
instruction in question was a mandatory rebuttable presumption as defined by the
United States Supreme Court in Franklin and was thus unconstitutional. 709
P.2d at 326; 736 P.2d at 1045. In both cases, the constitutionally defective
instruction was followed by yet another instruction which defined "prima facie"
as "a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the
contrary." 709 P.2d at 326; 736 P.2d at 1044. Our Supreme Court and this
court found that this instruction could well have indicated to jurors that die
defendant was required to disprove guilt, resulting in an impermissible shift in
the burden of proof to the defendant. 709 P.2d at 326; 736 P.2d at 1045.
Therefore, even if the first instruction did not meet the definition of a mandatory
rebuttable presumption, use of the second instruction would itself have required
reversal because it relieved the state of its burden of proof. 709 P.2d at 326.
In this case, the state conceded that it could not prove that the offense of
consumption was committed in Utah, but nonetheless argued there is a
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"presumption" that consumption occurred within the state unless rebutted by
evidence to the contrary. The court adopted this view and found that, absent
testimony to the contrary from defendant, the "natural inference" and "statistical
probability" was that the drinking occurred in the vicinity of the arrest.
Notwithstanding the court's characterization of its basis for finding defendant
guilty as a "factual assumption" rather than a "legal presumption," we find the
court's approach unconstitutional because, semantics aside, it creates precisely
the type of evidentiary device prohibited by Chambers and Turner. The
approach "requires the [fact-finder] to find the element unless the defendant
persuades the [fact-finder] that such a finding is unwarranted." State v.
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045.
Moreover, even if the evidentiary device used in this case does not fit within the
Chambers-Turner definition of a mandatory rebuttable presumption, it
nonetheless has the effect of relieving the state of its burden of proof on the fact
of jurisdiction and is thus unconstitutional under the standard articulated in In re
Winship, requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. 397 U.S. at 364. Despite the
state's concession to the contrary, jurisdiction is not an element of the offense in
this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1978). However, the rule
established in Winship is not limited to those facts essential to establish the
elements of the offense in the technical sense. Cf Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698-99 & n.25 (1979) (Winship rule "is concerned with substance rather
than this kind of formalism" and is not "limited to those facts that constitute a
crime as defined by state law.").
Id. Sorenson may not be on point with this matter, but the rationale behind the decision
holds true requiring this Court to review the trial court's decision. In this matter, like
in Sorenson, the trial court unjustly imposed the burden on the defendant to persuade
the court regarding jurisdiction. The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
dismiss and the subsequent denial of the defendant's motion for reconsideration was
plain error. The trial court should have dismissed the matter because the State failed to
show that the defendant was on probation and it failed to show that the defendant
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knowingly violationed the terms of his probation.
In Sorenson, this Court concluded:
Without regard to the location of defendant's arrest, we find the presumption or
assumption used by the court unconstitutional in that it shifted the burden of
proof on the fact of jurisdiction to defendant in violation of the due process
clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Id. Mr. Spainhower urges this Court to conclude the same and reverse this matter with
instructions to discharge the defendant as it had in Sorenson.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Spainhower has been unjustly treated in this matter. The trial court
concluded that Mr. Spainhower violated his probation. Unfortunately, the trial court
exceeded its authority in several ways. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the
defendant because Judge Braithwaite had closed this matter. Moreover, Mr.
Spainhower, never had notice of what his terms of probation were nor the duration of
said probation. Finally, the trial court improperly placed the burden onto the defendant
rather than the State regarding the violation.
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//. RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment and guilty verdict

of Mr. Spainhower for Retaliation Against a Witness, a Third Degree Felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953, as amended). (R. at 394.135). The
State failed to prove each element of the crime as required by Utah Code Ann. §76-1501 (1953, as amended). Upon closing of the case, the defense moved to dismiss the
matter and the trial court denied the motion. (R. at 394.89). Instead, the trial court
submitted the matter to the jury and the jury convicted the defendant based upon the
passion and prejudice.

//.

Course of the Proceedings:
On March 4, 1997, the State filed an Information alleging retaliation

against a witness. The Information was filed because the defendant allegedly
approached the witness, Sherry Reeves in Albertson's grocery store and said, "I'm
going to get you." (R. at 300.5) However, later at trial the witness apparently lied
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claiming the defendant said, "I'm going to get you for lying in court, you fat birth."
abd followed her around the store carrying a non-dairy creamer container. She also
reported in the Order to Show Cause proceeding that the defendant had run into on
multiple occasions. This fact was omitted at the time of trial.
Prior to this date, the defense had filed a motion to reduce the charges to
harassment or stalking on June 20, 1997. (R. at 248). Said motion was based upon the
allegations that the defendant had ran into the witness, Sherry Reeves, on multiple
occasions. (R. at 300.5-6; see memorandum in support, Addendum I). The State
responded claiming that a reduction was not warranted as the February 28, 1997
incident was "only one encounter." The State denied that there where any prior
incidents. (R. at 250; see opposition memorandum, Addendum J). Subsequently, the
trial court conducted a motion hearing and took the matter under advisement. (R. at
277). Based the State's argument, the trial court denied the defendant's motion. (R. at
280; see Memorandum Decision, Addendum K).
Thereafter trial convened and the jury convicted Mr. Spainhower.

77/.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial court denied Mr. Spainhower's motion to reduce charge. The

trial court sustained the State's objection when the defense attempted to have the
witness testify about the nature of the prior criminal proceeding after the witness
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testified about the defendant's
Spainhower's motion to dismiss for lack of evidence.

i \.

statement of Facts:
iL

Prior proceeding,

Order to Show Cause.

The witness (hereinafter "Reeves") testified at the order to show cause
hearing that on Februar> «..\ i vv , u., defendant approached her at Albertson's
grew

•

•

• nukk' eye ui II.H I "' 'I crever he ran into

me, wherever he followed me." (R. at 5). Reeves testified that Spainhowe i t :)I i 1 le ir,
"I'm going to get you," (R. at 300.5,7). The judge asked for clarification and
spt\ i: .i . . * .jUL^i^ ...
"That's all he Miki

r .<

._ quuu in. \\,)rJ:5. ;>he responded, "I'm going to get you"
|in vain n«i phi

I in In i h i iiilliu uiunsri in

rushing through her response to the judge's query. (R. at 394.65-68).
At that same hearing, Reeves reported that she felt like she was being
harass* n) In, l\ 11 Spaniln iw i

i U at A \\ I,iS

She also testified as to the number of

times Mr. Spainhower had run into the Reeves / U m <0(i "mi Rfrvrs sluled
I can't number the times [she has had dealings with the defendant]. Albertson's,
in front of Pay less, in front of Smith's. He's followed me all over. He's passed
me in his car, following me up and down, back and forth, in front of me, behind
me, beside me, in front of me and lailghing.
Id. The defense, brought out that this is a small town and thnv air only ilirn; smu's
and one shoe store in Cedar City (R at 300.8-10) Meaning the likelihood that Mr.
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Spainhower and Reeves would "run into" one another is great. (R. at 300.5).

B.

Trial Proceeding.
In opening arguments, the State identifies that it would prove that Mr.

Spainhower's motive was to harass her, (r. at 394.35), not to cause bodily injury. The
difference between the defense's urged misdemeanor conduct versus the State's
suggested felony conduct.
During trial, Reeves fails to alleged a threat of bodily injury. At no time
during either proceedings was any evidence introduced to the contrary. The following
facts are the only facts presented to the jury. Moreover, the witnesses testimony is in
greater detail than that provided during the Order to Show Cause proceeding and is
likely the product of suggestion as the witness and the State walked through the store
and allegedly refreshed the witnesses testimony. (R. at 394.78).
Reeves testified that she entered into Albertson's on February 28th. She
testified-in detail-the aisles she went down. (R. at 394.47,48,50). She provided a
detailed history of her occupation, her family and unrelated personal history. (R. at 3739).8 She also, testified in great detail as to the products she purchased. However, this
suggested list of items while strolling through the store aisles is only generalized and

8

Apparently, the State's attempt to build a feeling of an acquaintance between the
jury and the witness.
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not a specific recollection (11 fir tkilr in qiK'siinn il<! , ! I'M (>V , Is(

MUM

explanation, Reeves explains early in the trial that she is afraid of Mr. Spainhower. (R.
at 394 .49).

•••.
Nniu'dk'k'N!., jill (lu'f.i: l;n is ( ml in prciudiu" I he delciklanl in Lhe eyes of

the jury. They are all irrelevant as to the conduct justifying a felony convictioi i :)f
Retaliation Against a Witness. Conceedingly, Reeves was a witness in Mr.
Spainho w er's pi ioi com Ictloi 1 of i e tail theft

However, the defendant did not convey a

threat to do bodil
Reeves testified at trial, that after picking up her cheese and looking for
milk next she saw Mr. Spainhower, looking at her while tossing a non-dairy creamer
coin in iiiM" ln

standing there and staring. Ki, a. 3^4.43)

,if

she reported that he carried only the creamer
394.49) She claims that he called her "pitiful." Furthermore, the extent of the threat
was testified to be, I m going to get you for lying in court, you fat bitch" as he walked

Apparently, the State's attempt to build trust and reliability of the witnesses
testimony for the jury's sake. However, clearly she indicated that she didn't remember
back that far to February 28, 1997. She even admitted that she couldn't even remember
back as far as her testimony at the June 10, 1997 preliminary hearing even though she has
never testified before, (R. at 394.63,75,79).
10

Apparently drawing a nexus between the retail theft conviction of too many refills
of coffee with the retaliation against her for the prior conviction. For this reason, the prior
conviction was a probative evidence to the crime rather than prejudicial.

past her.11 (R. at 394.51) No other statements or threats were alleged at trial.
Reeves' additional testimony called the jury's attention to Mr.
Spainhower's prior Wal-Mart arrest. (R. at 394.56). Upon cross examination by the
defense, the State objected and the trial court sustained the objection. (R. at 394.5758).12

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Three main issues are on appeal regarding this matter: (1) The trial court
committed reversible error by submitting this matter to the jury. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1953, as amended), the defense moved to dismiss this matter
upon conclusion of the State's case due to the absence of evidence pertaining to a
"threat to do bodily injury." As a matter of law, the State failed to prove all the
elements of the crime. (2) The trial court committed reversible error by not
reducing the crime from a Third Degree Felony to a Misdemeanor. The
defendant's conduct is no felonious, the witness testified that the defendant had
followed her on numerous occasions. This conduct may constitute possible harassment
11

Apparently the product of suggestion, in light of the varied testimony from the
June 6th proceeding. See, generally, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
12

The effect of the sustained objection precluded the defense from clarifying the
basis for the arrest and thereby precluded the defense from removing the prejudice caused
by the accidentally inclusion of evidence pertaining to prior bad acts. The evidence that
the prior crime of a minor offense and the termination of probation would have removed
possible prejudice.
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or stalking charges but

TICK

n l a l k i f i m i j i i u i n s i i w inn ^

ml Hi T i n il1

Il 11 iiiiiii il

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiililii d

reversible error by not allowing mitigating testimony about the defendant's prior
bad act, I he witness was allowed to educate the jury about the defendant's prior
arrest I: i it :: n :::i oss exai n Ii lation , tl le \ < - itne ss was not allowed to testify about the nature
of the offense and other relevant conduct

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MR. SPAINHOWER WAS WRONGFULLY CHARGED WITH

RETALIATI0N

AGAINST A WITNESS.
A. Introduction.
STALKING, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106.5 (1953, as amended), is, inter
u .. Ki ^ : Misdemeanor when:
. (2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course o u K
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(I) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his
immediate family;
(It! lias knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or
a member of his family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate
family will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct;
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or
a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) cause emotional distress in the spe i-l t,
his immediate family.
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Id.
HARASSMENT, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106 (1953, as amended), is a
Class B Misdemeanor when:
[The actor], with intent to frighten or harass another, he communicates a
written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony.
IdL
B. Grounds.
The Grounds for this motion is that Mr. Spainhower is entitled to the
benefit of the lessor penalty when certain conduct is prohibited by different or
conflicting statutes.

C. Case Law-State v. Shondel.
A defendant is entitled to be charged under a statute carrying the lessor
penalty. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). In Shondel, the Supreme Court
agreed with the proposition advocated by the defendant "that the equal protection of the
laws requires that they affect alike all persons similarly situated." Id. Consistently, the
Court reasoned:
[W]here there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is
applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser.
This impels the conclusion here that the clear, specific and lesser penalty
prescribed for the offense as a misdemeanor . . . is the one which should
be imposed. We say this mindful of our statute which provides that the
common-law rule of strict construction of statutes is not applicable in this
state. But it is our opinion the conclusion we have reached is in harmony
28

with that section's further mandate that our statutes should be "construed
according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect the objects
of the statutes and to promote justice."
Id.

As a result the Shondel Court found the wrong sentence had been imposed and

r c i i i t i i n l n ) llu 1 tiKit11 i li.n I I n I h r I n ill i . n i i i l

H lli.H Ihi i n mi mi icmlh fin c u u i l i l In;

:

imposed.
The case at hand is on point with Shondel. If is clear and undoubtful that
llu n iiiiidiiul si lik In has \\\ in ikuhbi il I) llii \ iiJiiii and allegations made against Mr.
Spainhower better describes violation of the Stalkin

-n^

Utah Code; not the Retaliation Against a Witness provision.
r

I he victim in this proceeding reportedly indicated that Mr. Spainhower

indicated that Mr. Spainhower had communicated a threat to her that he was <?o:ni? o
get her.
Meanwhile, the crime Mi. Spainhower has been charged with is
Retalia*

->.
RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS, Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-8-508

(1953, as amended), is a Third Degree Felony when:
A person knowingly and intentionally communicated to a person would believe
to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed by
the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or
investigation.
Id.

In light of the absence of the "threat to do bodily injury" the retaliation charge is
2 9

not an appropriate offense to allege. On the other hand, clearly the testimony above
describes either offense of stalking or harassment. Reeves has testified that she feels
threatened by Mr. Spainhower, that Mr. Spainhower is harassing her, and that Mr.
Spainhower has ran into her and she has had dealing with him on multiple occasions.

POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
ACTION FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE.
The defense moved for a dismissal upon conclusion of the State's case on
the basis that the State failed to prove all the element of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt.

A. Introduction.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-501 defines what an "Element of the
offense" is by stating:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed,
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but
shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. (Emphasis added).
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because the State had failed to disturb the presumption of innocence

In fhr i

!z

State has failed to prove beyond the reasonable doubt that Mr. Spainhower committed
Ilit I-, litii\ ol ivctali.itii>ii Against a Witness in violation o; Section /t>-8-508 of the I Jtah
Code.
In order to convict Mr. Spainhower of Retaliation Against a Witness, the
prosecution must prove all the elements which are:
in 1 i r h i i i j i \

„ H ' ll 1 ! 1 ! " ill \ III in; i | K\ in ni «, MI 11 in. I'll L i l L e t

1.

1 Ii ill

2.

The defendant communicated to a person a threat,

3.

That a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to

tl le pei son,
4..

•:. Because of any act pei foi i i led oi I: : 1: e p 51 foi n 1 z- :i h] ' the person in his

capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation.
At question here is element no 3 as listed above. "That a reasonable
p e i s t H I I N D I I I I I In linn 1 11 In I d i n 11 i n ill! I U M | I I \ ij 111111 in, i n illiiin 11 LJis111 ni

ill ilic UKtl i n ( h i s

matter, never was there any testimony or other evidence provided that demonstrated a
"threat to do bodily injury to the person" occurred. Specifically, Ms. Reeves described
]\ !i Spaii it io\* ei as fc I lc 1 v ii lg :)i stalkii lg her tl iroughout uic store and 'then
communicated to her, "I'm going to gel mil" \\r " I'm i'oiiii'" In pyi MIM fm lum

1

court, you fat bitch"-whichever you want to believe. At any rate, this conveyed threat
falls short of one conveying a threat to cause physical pain, illness, or physical
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B. Definitions.
Retaliation Against a Witness is defined as:
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been
summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another as a
witness or informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing
any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe
to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to
be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official
proceeding or investigation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1997) (Emphasis added).
Bodily Injury is defined as:
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (3) (1997).

C. The State Failed to Prove thai Defendant Conveyed a Threat to Cause
Physical Pain, Illness, or Any Physical Condition.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 requires the prosecution to prove all the
elements of a crime beyond the reasonable doubt or the defendant must be acquitted
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condition. A reasonable person could not believe just 111 nlie^al st.itcmenl alone lo
means a threat to do bodily injury.
Bodily Injury is defined by ( Uta Code Ami

,

o-i-(n)h3) as, "physical

••ilness, or a m Ii i lpaii i nent of ph> sical coi lditioi i " I here ai 11 nanj othei

•' • ;"

interpretations that can be perceived from said statement other than that of bodily
injury. (E.g., harass, follow, intimidate, sue, etc.) These acts may be felonious under

felonious under either subsections 76-8-508(1) or 76-8-508(2).
At any rate, the prosecution, failed to introduce any evidence that fulfills
the element of the crime pertaining to bodily injury, therefore the conviction will not
^ v ithsta rid appellate i e\ lew.
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (1988),
discussed due process concerns, when the State fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt
t .

t

/^a

..:

-riminal charge.

however, put on absolutely no evidence ot |iins<lh Ii

. :u

.:n concluded,

I;., state,

'-1 inslrud ei T -

lln

presumption that the consumption of alcohol occurred with the state. Based thereupon,
the Court remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to discharge the
defendant.
Even though the issue in Sorenson was one of jurisdiction because the
defendant was arrested two miles outside of the State of Utah, nonetheless, the
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reasoning holds true in this case. Mr. Spainhower is protected by due process, due
process requires the State to prove each and every fact beyond the reasonable doubt
necessary to constitute the crime charged. Supra. In this case, the State failed to prove
the most critical element of the crime which constitutes the felony aspect of the
Retaliation Against a Witness. That element is a threat to do bodily injury. No such
evidence was provided. The mere threat, "I'm going to get you" is not sufficient to
convey a threat to do bodily injury to a reasonable person.
This Court upon de novo review should conclude that as a matter of law,
the trial court should have acquitted Mr. Spainhower, because the State failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant conveyed a threat to do bodily injury.

POINT III.
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR BAD ACT CAUSED UNDUE PREJUDICE AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT CAUSE DISPROPORTIONATE CONVICTION.

A. Evidence of Prior Crimes.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
UtahR. Evid. 404(b).
B. Inadmissible Except to Prove Other Than Character of Person in Order to
Show Action in Conformity Therewith.
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The test here is the probative value outweighs the potential prejudice
caused b> tl le acii i i issioi 1 : f pi ioi bad coi ldi ict

I lie probative value of the evidence

must "outweigh its tendenc) to i infa Ill) pre ji idice the • cleft i ida i it in • :: i dei to be
admissible" under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. In this matter, the testimonial evidence
offered by Reeves pertaining to the defendant's prior conviction unfairly prejudiced
l" In ')|ui]iiim< i

i Hue linn, deil'ir*!1 ,iiirni|iiril I miiijuu IIH piejudiie tauscd in cioss-

examining the witness, the State objected and the trial court sustained the objection.
The United States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi, 4! ~ ' ".S. 284 (1973)
recognized

., JJL . . : ,n: u) cross-examine is essential to a fair trial. By precluding the

cross examination, the trial coi irt si lbstai itial can is sd tl le iefei idant to 1: e pi e judiced w hiel I
resulted in an unfair trial. Clearly, the jury should have heard testimony that the prior
arrest was for a minor offense and that the probation for the defendant had terminated.
CONCLUSION
Upon a review of these issues for correctness, tl lis I Ioi i Drablc < "
overturn both appeals as a matter of law.
RESPEC ITT II I * SI JBN II I FED this
August, 1998.

12th da> of
'

s>

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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ADDENDUMA

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
26. [Provisions tiandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

PREAMBLE
Article
L Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative D e p a r t m e n t
VH. Executive D e p a r t m e n t
VIII. Judicial D e p a r t m e n t
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns
XII.
Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
XTV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XEX. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXTV. Schedule

Section 1. [Inherent a n d i n a l i e n a b l e rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of t h a t
right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e p e o p l e . ]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896

Sec. 3. [ U t a h i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e U n i o n . ]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is tb.3
supreme law of the land.
1896

Sec. 4. [Religious l i b e r t y — No p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n
to v o t e or h o l d office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
PREAMBLE
shall make no law respecting an establishment cf religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test 3hall be
£krj3t&fuJ to Almighty God far )]fe JIB 6 llharty we. $hej>eop)e required as a qualification for any office ofpubiic trust or for
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUas a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
TION,
.-.
1896
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
ARTICLE I
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person tc vote,
Section
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power i n h e r e n t in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to ote :>r
hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
l€. (jSb imprisonment for de6t — Exception, f
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — E x post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
2 1 . [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]

%

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right t o b e a r a r m s . ]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd s.s.)
Sec. 7. [Due process of law. J
No person shall be deprived cf life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 3, jOffenses
bailable.)
(1) All persons charged wit: . -jr.tut M U . , j e .
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is

Art. I, § 9
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
t h e court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)
S e c . 9.

[ E x c e s s i v e bail a n d fines — C r u e l p u n i s h ments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
S e c . 10. [Trial b y j u r y . ]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer t h a n eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
S e c . 11. [ C o u r t s o p e n — R e d r e s s of i n j u r i e s . ]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

S e c . 12. [ R i g h t s of a c c u s e d p e r s o n s . ]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
n a t u r e and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
S e c . 13.

[ P r o s e c u t i o n by i n f o r m a t i o n or i n d i c t m e n t —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
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S e c . 14.

[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s f o r b i d d e n — Issua n c e of w a r r a n t . ]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no w a r r a n t shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
t r u t h may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury t h a t the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
S e c . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — E x c e p t i o n . ]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
S e c . 17. [Elections to b e free — S o l d i e r s v o t i n g . ]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
S e c . 18.

[Attainder — Ex p o s t facto l a w s — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
S e c . 20. [Military s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a m a n n e r to be prescribed by law.
1896
S e c . 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
S e c . 22. [Private p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without j u s t compensation.
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable f r a n c h i s e s forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform o p e r a t i o n of laws.]
All laws of a general n a t u r e shall have uniform operation.
1896

Sec. 25. [Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
1896
Sec. 26. [ P r o v i s i o n s m a n d a t o r y and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
1&96
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Sec. 21. [ F u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s . ]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government.
1896
Sec. 28. [ D e c l a r a t i o n of t h e r i g h t s of c r i m e victims.]
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity,
and to be free from h a r a s s m e n t and abuse throughout the
criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related
to the victim, either in person or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or indictment
charging a crime h a s been publicly filed in court; and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider,
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense except that this subsection
does not apply to capital cases or situations involving
privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal
judgment.
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile
offenses, as the Legislature may provide.
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and
define this section by statute.
1994
ARTICLE II

Art, IV § 1

The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of this State:
[Religious toleration — P o l y g a m y f o r b i d d e n j
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.
1896
[Right to p u b l i c d o m a i n d i s c l a i m e d — T a x a t i o n of l a n d s
— Exemption.]
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and t h a t until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing
without this State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in
this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who
has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from the
United States or from any person, by patent or other grant, a
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress,
containing a provision exempting the lands thus granted from
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided
in the act of Congress granting the same.
\lU\

STATE BOUNDARIES
[Territorial debts assumed.]
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of Utah,
incurred by authority of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State.
1896

Section
1. [State boundaries.]
S e c t i o n 1. [ S t a t e b o u n d a r i e s . ]
The boundaries of the State of U t a h shall be as follows:
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude; thence due west
along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to the
intersection of the same with t h e thirty-seventh degree of
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude;
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north latitude to the intersection of t h e s a m e with the thirty-fourth
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of the same with t h e forty-first degree of north latitude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-second
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place
of beginning.
1896
ARTICLE III
ORDINANCE
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption.]
[Territorial debts assumed.]
[Free nonsectarian schools.]

[ F r e e n o n s e c t a r i a n schools.]
Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which
shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from
sectarian control.
1896
ARTICLE IV
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
Section
1. [Equal political rights.]
2. [Qualifications to vote.]
3. [Voters — Immunity from arrest. 1
4. [Voters — Immunity from militia duty.]
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.}
6 [Mentally incompetent persons and certain criminals ineligible to vote.]
7. [Property qualification forbidden.]
8. [Ballot to be secret.]
9. [General and special elections — Terms.]
10. [Oath of office.]
S e c t i o n 1. [Equal political r i g h t s . ]
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold
office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all
civil, political and religious rights and privileges.
ifi%

Art, IV, § 4

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

576

AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT VIII

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to b e a r arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
m a n n e r to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g — Due proc e s s of l a w and j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where t h e value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT IX
[Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
AMENDMENT X
[ P o w e r s r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s o r people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENTXI
[Suits a g a i n s t s t a t e s — R e s t r i c t i o n of j u d i c i a l power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XU
[Election of P r e s i d e n t a n d Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President,
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President,
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
Senators, and a majority of the whole n u m b e r shall be
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible
to the office of President shall be eligible to t h a t of VicePresident of the United States.
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A M E N D M E N T XIII
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
Section 1. [Slavery p r o h i b i t e d . ]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof t h e party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within t h e United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec, 2. [Power to e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
A M E N D M E N T XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — D u e p r o c e s s of l a w — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in t h e United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State w h e r e i n they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of t h e United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to a n y person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of t h e laws.
Sec, 2.

[Representatives — P o w e r to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each S t a t e , excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote a t any election for the choice
of electors for President a n d Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, t h e Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or t h e m e m b e r s of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of t h e m a l e inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, t h e basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
mals citizens shall bear to t h e whole n u m b e r of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such S t a t e .
Sec, 3. [Disqualification t o h o l d office.]
No person shall be a S e n a t o r or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President a n d Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , or under any State,
who> having previously t a k e n a n oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of t h e United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or a s a n executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support t h e Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to t h e enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec s 4.

[Public d e b t n o t t o b e q u e s t i o n e d — D e b t s of
t h e C o n f e d e r a c y a n d c l a i m s n o t t o b e paid.]
The validity of the public debt of t h e United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions

Amend. XVIII, § 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [ P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Right of c i t i z e n s to v o t e — R a c e or color
not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. [ P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVT
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVII
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT

XVIII

[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION 1.]
Section
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Time limit for adoption.]
Section 1. [National p r o h i b i t i o n — I n t o x i c a t i n g liquors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
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this town is doing

15

ability

Do you, at the present time, take

8

11

the

six?

betcha.

Okay.

A.

10

do you h a v e

a G.E.D .
Q.

any

Spainhower,

3-25-96

Objection, Your Honor.

hearing now that we're having

court?
THE

COURT:

How does it --

Is
in
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MR. BRICKEY:
the ability

I'm

3-25-96
just wondering

if he has

to comprehend one through six or if we

have a m e d i c a t i o n problem here, Your Honor.
what

I'm

curious

about.

THE COURT:
anything

if we do.

Okay.

I can't convict him of

Is that your

MR. BRICKEY:
we convict

Yeah.

concern?

I'm

concerned that if

him after this we're going to have an

issue on appeal about whether or not
competent.

If counsel will testify

at this point

to the fact

he's
-- or stipulate

that the man is competent, then I

suppose we can go forward.

to that

That's

We have heard him

allege

that the town is after him or something

effect.
THE W I T N E S S :

Well, I have doctors

that

will back me one hundred percent, sir, on my -THE COURT:
motion, but
don't want

This is normally a defense

the prosecution
a conviction

is making

it.

in the case, you believe

there should be a study into his mental
MR. BRICKEY:
point,

the defendant
THE COURT:

of a feel

So you

capacity?

Y e s , Your Honor.

At

this

-I don't

-- I don't have

enough

-- I have a question in the area, but I

don't know have enough of a feel, haven't

talked

34
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1

with him,

2

that there's

3

not?

as Mr. Barnes probably h a s .
a question the Court

4

MR. BARNES:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BARNES:

7

seat down

THE WITNESS:

9

(Bench

trial.

12

relevance

13

want

And

should address

or

approach?

Yeah, go

ahead.

Gary, why don't you have a

Sure.

Let's go forward with the

I'm going to sustain the objection

as to the question of the witness.

on
Do

you

to come back up here, Gary, ar.d have a seat.

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

feel

conference.)

THE COURT:

11

Can we

Do you

there.

8

10

3-25-96

Y e s , Your Honor.
You're

already under oath.

You can go ahead and have a seat.

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

if we were

20

case?

21

looking

22

conviction,

23

forward.

Okay.
All r i g h t .

Let me just

state,

looking at -- this is a shoplifting

Normally it would carry a fine.
at deprivation

at liberty

We're

not

if there's a

so I'm going to allow the case to go

24

MR. BRICKEY:

25

THE COURT:

Thank y o u , Your Honor.
Any other

questions?

35
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MR. BRICKEY:
MR. BARNES:
THE COURT:
step d o w n .

Any other
MR. B A R N E S :
THE COURT:

require

3-25-96

None at this point.
No, Your Honor.
An redirect?

violation.

can

No, Your Honor.
All right.

that the defendant

many r e f i l l s .

You

witnesses?

argument on this case.

evidence

Okay.

I don't think I
I find from

the

is guilty, taking

too

It's not a big case, but it's still a

Should we have sentencing

today or at a

later d a t e , 2 to 30 days from now?
MR. BRICKEY:
make

The State is prepared

to

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , Your Honor.
THE COURT:

$150.

The standard fine would be

I would anticipate you may have some

on no contact orders or something
MR. BRICKEY:

requests

like that.

Yes, Your Honor.

Certainly

we do .
MR. B A R N E S :
Gary,

I'll

I would feel comfortable

--

take care of that.
THE COURT:

Do you want to have

sentencing

today or come back in a week?
THE D E F E N D A N T :
y o u , Your

Honor?
MR. B A R N E S :

No.

Can I explain something

to

36
951501084
THE DEFENDANT:

3-25-96

I'm on SSI, on

limited

funds.
THE COURT:
MR. BRICKEY:

Okay.
I would like to go

ahead

with that today, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
request

All right.

What do you

in the way of sentencing, and then I'll

the defendant

--

MR. BRICKEY:
the defendant
following

let

Specifically,

I would

like

to be ordered to stay away from

individuals that testified:

the

Norman

Chandler, Kurt Gale, Henry Velasco, Sherry

Reeves

and though he was not present, Russell Grieder
Grieder, as well as Sheldon Barney.

And I would

also ask that the defendant be advised to not
any members of the Fifth District
County Attorney's

or

follow

Court or the

Iron

Office.

THE COURT:

All right.

Standard

150 or are you requesting more than
MR. BRICKEY:

Standard

fine of

that?

fine of 150

would

be appropriate, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Ma'am, who

are

you?
VOICE:

I'm his mother.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Go ahead and have a

37
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seat.

We don't need your participation.
VOICE:

on, Y o u r

W e l l , there's a lot of lying

in contempt

Have a seat.

here.

MR. B A R N E S :
Brickey's
fine.

I don't want

Okay.

with the exception of the

is on disability.

He does not

earn very much money, and I would ask that the
be reduced

at least

Anything

MR. B R I C K E Y :

THE C O U R T :

counsel?

Sure.

MR. B R I C K E Y :
S p a i n h o w e r was booked

else?

Just one moment, Your

May I a p p r o a c h ,

Your Honor, when Mr.
into the Iron

County

F a c i l i t y , he had $2,401 on his person.

I have

the b o o k i n g

amount

in q u e s t i o n when he was booked.

that m u c h compared

slip receipt

for that

-- for that
$150 is not

to 2,401.

THE D E F E N D A N T :

Well, may I make a

statement ?
THE C O U R T :
attorney

Go ahead and talk to your

for a m i n u t e , and then he'll be your

spokesperson.

fine

to half.

THE C O U R T :

Correctional

you

Your Honor, I concur with Mr.

recommendation

Mr. Spainhower

Honor.

going

Honor.
THE C O U R T :

to get

3-25-96
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THE D E F E N D A N T :
loaned m e .

Okay,

I'm

That's money my parents

sir?

THE C O U R T :
follows:

3-25-96

going

All right.

Sentence

is as

to suspend, you don't have

to

serve 90 days jail as long as you do probation
adequately.

You don't have to do any jail time.

Fine of $75 to be paid on or before April 29th
review at 10:30 that

day.

The term of probation
harass any of the

for

is to not follow or

-- let's put this in a formal

sentence prepared by the county attorney's

office

and then list the names of the individuals that
stated employed

at Wal-Mart and the court and

you

county

attorney p e r s o n n e l .
MR. B R I C K E Y :

Thank you.

THE D E F E N D A N T :

Your Honor, may I make a

statement?
THE C O U R T :
order.

I've

disability.

We're done.

That's

the

gone light on the fine because of
Probably the most significant part

the order to stay away from people.
MR. B A R N E S :

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE D E F E N D A N T :
writing,

Could I get that

in

sir?
THE C O U R T :

Yeah.

We'll give you a

your
is

ADDENDUM C

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT (IRON)
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF CEDAR CITY
VS
SPAINHOWER, GARY WAYNE
73 SOUTH 200 WEST
CEDAR CITY
UT 84720

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
CASE NO: 9515010&
DOB: 01/07/6#
TAPE: 032596C^TNT: 01:46
DATE: 03/25/9&

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR g'HE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-6-602 RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING)
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
150.00
Susp:
75.00
Jail:
0 DA
Susp: 90 DA
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 35%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
CALENDAR:
NON JURY TRIAL
REVIEW HEARING

AC$:

0

0.00

Due:

55.56

0.00

Due:

19.44

0.00

Due:

75.00

03/25/96 01:30 PM in rm 1 with RO^JRT T BRAITHWAITE
04/29/96 10:30 AM in rm 1 with ROfi&RT "T BRAITHWAITE

00023

SPAINHOWER, GARY WAYNE

CASE NO: 9515010JS

PAGE

2

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present
ATD: BARNES, KEITH
PRO: BURNS, SCOTT M
Tape: 032596
Count: 01:46
Judge: ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE
Chrg: RETAIL THEFT
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Gi|§lty Plea
Fine Amount:
150.00
Suspended:
75.00
Jail:
0 to 90
Suspended: 90
REV
scheduled for 04/29/96 at 103 0 A in room llwith RTB

BY THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE
OF ENTRY OF THIS

J H 4 ^ E / C J 0 M M I S SI ONER

30 DAYS

00022

ADDENDUM D

5?n Judicial DIPTIC: i-'m-ir™ Counfv
DAVID R. BRICKEY (#4283)
Deputy Iron County Attorney
91 North Main, Suite #2
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737

F
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE,
AND ORDER OF PROBATION

vs.
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 951501084
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

The Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having been found guilty of RETAIL
THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor, on March 25, 1996, and the Court having called the above-entitled
matter on for sentencing on March 25, 1996, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant,
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having appeared before the Court in person together with his
attorney of record, Keith C. Barnes, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy
Iron County Attorney David R. Brickey, and the Court having reviewed the file in detail and
thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County
Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, has been convicted of the offense of RETAIL THEFT, a Class B
Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period
of ninety (90) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, pay a
fine in the sum and amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000).

STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and the
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months under
the supervision of the Court (bench probation), strictly within the following terms, provisions, and
conditions:
1.

Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation.
-2-

00

2.

Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75). This matter

shall be reviewed April 29, 1996, at 10:30 a.m. in the Fifth District Court, 40 North 100 East, Cedar
City, Utah.
3.

Defendant shall not follow, intimidate, nor harass (1) Sherry Reeves, (2) Norman

Chandler, (3) Kurt Gale, (4) Henry Velasco, (5) Russell T. Greider, (6) personnel of the Iron County
Attorney's Office, and (7) members and personnel of the Fifth District Court.
DATED this . — ^ day of March, 1996.
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• ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, LTNDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation in the case entitled State of Utah
vs. Gary Wavne Spainhower. Criminal No. 951501084, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
Apfi
this I S h day ofMafeh, 1996.
V

•*pS^T
Ss.

( SEAL

)
v

LINDA WILLIAMSON
District Court Clerk

V 0:>|if"
Deputy District Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM E

D. B r u c e O l i v e r # 5 1 2 0
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
180 S o u t h 300 W e s t , S u i t e 210
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84101-1218
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 2 8 - 8 8 8 8
Fax: (801) 595-0300

'C£":

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
:
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
Case No. 951501084
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
:

J u d g e J . P h i l i p Eves

Defendant.

Comes now t h e D e f e n d a n t ,
through counsel,

D. B r u c e O l i v e r ,

memorandum of p o i n t s
bench

Gary Wayne S p a i n h o w e r , by and
and r e s p e c t f u l l y

and a u t h o r i t i e s

submits

in opposition to

this

continued

probation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
the facts

F o r p u r p o s e s of t h i s m o t i o n D e f e n d a n t g e n e r a l l y
as s e t o u t by the p l a i n t i f f

following paragraphs:

1,

w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of

3 , 6, 9 and 1 1 , w h i c h p a r a g r a p h s

f a c t u a l l y disputed by t h e defendant,

accepts
the

are

i n whole o r i n p a r t .

nnlOS

ARGUMENT
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is valid for either of
two reasons.

Attached herewith as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the

judgment which was prepared by the Iron County Attorney's Office
and submitted to the Court-

This document was never served upon

the defendant or his counsel.
as to form or content.
anyone.

This document was never approved

There is no certificate of mailing to

The Order contains gratuitous language which was not

ordered by the court.

Attached herewith as Exhibit 2 are pages

35-39 inclusive of the trial and sentencing of Mr. Spainhower.
On page 38 of the transcript the defendant specifically requested
that he receive a copy of the courts sentence in writing, the
judge responded that the defendant would receive a copy of the
order after Mr. Brickey typed it up. This never did occur, the
defendant never did receive a copy of the order.
The first point which would require a dismissal of this
case is that the case was closed by Judge Braithwaite on April
29, 1996.

This is indicated in the Docket of this case which is

attached as Exhibit 3.

This argument was raised at the time of

the hearing on the Order of Show Cause. Your Honor denied this
Motion at that time; however, the transcript included herewith
clarifies the facts of this issue.
states:

The Court on page 35 line 9

"It's not a big case, but it's still a violation."

The

Judge set a review date in this matter of April 29, at 10:30
a.m., that was the same date the fine of $75.00 was due. The
fine was paid as ordered.
probationary period.

The judge did not specify a

The period of 1 year was gratuitously added

ex-parte by the County Attorney's Office when they prepared the

2
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Order.

The review date set by Judge Braithwaite and contained

within the order was the time within which the court expected
performance and was the date set to close the case.

Judge

Braithwaite routinely sets a review date in less important cases
and upon the payment of the fines he closes the case.
is neither unique nor unusual in that context.

This case

Judge Braithwaite

closed this case as he would any other minor theft case under
similar circumstances.

Judge Braithwaite1 s closing of the case

should not be summarily disregarded, when indeed it follows Judge
Braithwaite's standard procedure.

The addition of the

probationary period by the County Attorney's Office should not
prejudice Mr. Spainhower.

Mr. Spainhower respectfully requests

that this Court reconsider this portion of the Court's prior
ruling.

To allow this to go unchecked would be a clear violation

of due process in this case.

Mr. Spainhower was never adequately

informed of what was expected of him.
given notice of the court's order.

Mr. Spainhower was not

Further with the additions by

the County Attorney's Office, there is significant confusion in
the obligations of Mr. Spainhower.
The second point for which this Order to Show Cause
should be dismissed is that the time had run and that the
defendant's probation had terminated by operation of law.

Utah

Code Annotated Section 77-18-1 (11) (b) provides:
The running of the probation period is tolled upon
the filing of a violation report with the court
alleging a violation of the terms and conditions
of probation or upon the issuance of an order to
show cause or a warrant by the court.
Id.

This provision of the Code provides that there are two

different situations which will toll the running of the

3
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probationary period.

These situations are 1) when there has been

a violation report filed with the court; and 2) the issuance of
an order to show cause or warrant of arrest by the court.

The

first situation is a document which is prepared and generated by
Adult Parole and Probation as a result of their supervision of
the probationer.

Mr. Spainhower was not supervised by the

Department of Adult Parole and Probation, nor did they file a
violation report.

The second method involves the issuance of an

order to show cause or a warrant of arrest.

These two documents

are generated by either the court or the prosecutor's office.
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-1 (12 (b) provides:
(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging
with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if
the affidavit establishes probable cause to
believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable
cause it shall cause to be served on the defendant
a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his
probation should not be revoked, modified, or
extended.
Id.

This provision indicates that in order for the court to

issue a warrant or order to show cause pursuant to this provision
there must first be submitted an affidavit to the court.

The

code provisions require that the affidavit must allege facts with
particularity.

In this case there are only general allegations

contained within the affidavit.

Paragraph 4 (a) and (b) are the

salient paragraphs and they are only general in nature.
Paragraph 4 (b) of the affidavit of Terry Petersen contains names
not specifically enumerated by Judge Braithwaite in court, they
were requested by Mr. Brickey, however the judge did not

4
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enumerate them.

Judge Braithwaite told Mr. Brickey to include in

his order the list of names and then to provide a copy of the
order to Mr. Spainhower.

The list of names was included however

the list was never provided to Mr. Spainhower.
The reference specifically to an affidavit in
connection with an order to show cause or a warrant of arrest
indicates that the filing of the affidavit is not comparable to
the filing of a violation report. An affidavit is for the
purpose of allowing the judge to determine from the detailed
facts whether there is probable cause to determine whether or not
an order to show cause should be issued. When this method is
employed it is the issuance of the order to show cause which
tolls the running of the probationary period.

In the Affidavit

of Terry Petersen he specifically requests that the court issue
an order to show cause directing and requiring the defendant to
appear before said court and show cause, if any he has, why the
aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked.

It is clear

that this affidavit was specifically prepared and submitted in
support of the issuance of an order to show cause. It is
likewise interesting that along with this affidavit was also
submitted a Bench Warrant and an Order to Show Cause. Under
these circumstances it is the issuance of either of the Bench
Warrant or the Order to Show Cause which tolls the running of
probation.

CONCLUSION
The lack of notice of the alleged probation order, in spite
of the court's direction that Mr. Spainhower be so advised and
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provided a copy of the written order, violates Mr. Spainhowerfs
rights to due process.

This case was closed by Judge Braithwaite

on April 29, 1996, in spite of the order prepared by the Iron
County Attorney's Office.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i)

provides that the court in it's own discretion may terminate
probation at any time.

Judge Braithwaite did this and this court

should recognize that decision by the judge and not tamper
therewith.
The filing of an affidavit is not the same as the
filing of a violation report.

The issuance of the bench warrant

or the order to show cause by the court is what was required in
this case to toll the running of the probationary period.

There

was no violation report filed with the court but rather an
affidavit, the purpose of which was to have the court issue a
warrant of arrest and or an order to show cause.
Under either position as contained herein the Order to
Show Cause should be dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

10th

day of

July, 1997.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant
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ih „ucic:al District Court - Iron Counrv
DAVID R. BRICKEY (#4283)
Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE,
AND ORDER OF PROBATION

vs.
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
Defendant.

Criminal No 951501084
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

The Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having been found guilty of RETAIL
THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor, on March 25, 1996, and the Court having called the above-entitled
matter on for sentencing on March 25, 1996, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant,
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having appeared before the Court in person together with his
attorney of record, Keith C. Barnes, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy
Iron County Attorney David R. Brickey, and the Court having reviewed the file in detail and
thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County
Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, has been convicted of the offense of RETAIL THEFT, a Class B
Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period
of ninety (90) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, pay a
fine in the sum and amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and the
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby placed on probation for a period of twelve*(12) months under
the supervision of the Court (bench probation), strictly within the following terms, provisions, and
conditions:
1.

Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation.
-2-

2.

Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75). This matter

shall be reviewed April 29, 1996, at 10:30 a.m. in the Fifth District Court, 40 North 100 East, Cedar
City, Utah.
3.

Defendant shall not follow, intimidate, nor harass (1) Sherry Reeves, (2) Norman

Chandler, (3) Kurt Gale, (4) Henry Velasco, (5) Russell T. Greider, (6) personnel of the Iron County
Attorney's Office, and (7) members and personnel of the Fifth District Court.
DATED this ^#t^avfff3s4arck 1996
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ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE
$I&J '$ District Court Judge
^
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./'CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation in the case entitled State of Utah
vs. Gary Wayne Spainhower, Criminal No. 951501084, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,

Apri I
this \ S h

day of-MaFeh,.,lQ^:p^

/ f i t | l k UNDA WIH.IAMSON
# ' . / / # p 8 ^ % \ *\

:

LINDA WILLIAMSON

g * f Sl|ffi|^ \ , sDistrict c ° u r t cierk
~

^;:y:*vr^*-;^ J;

Deputy District Court Clerk
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j
None at this point

MR . B R I C K E Y :
MR . B A R N E S :
THE C O U R T :
step d o w n .

Any

No, Your Honor.

THE C O U R T :
argument

evidence
many

viola : i o n .

i

the
toe

case , but it 's still a
a: a

toda y or

30 d ays from now?
Szate i s prepa red

The

to

r e c o m m e n dat i o n s , Your Honor.
THE C O U R T :

$150 .

orders

i

standard fine wo uld be

The

ant i c ipate ycu may have

I would

en no c o n t a c t

son e

reques t s

something like t hau.

or

MR . B R I C K E Y
we

I find from

we have sentencing

MR . B R I C K E Y :
make

I don't think I

All right.

It's not a big

later c a t e , 2 to

j

def endant is gui 11 y , t a king

S hould

<
i

No, Your H o n o r .

on this case.

that the

refills .

can

o t h e r wi tnes ses ?

MR . B A R N E S :

require

You

Okay .

An redirect:?

Yes,

Your Honor.

Certain1 y

do •
MR . B A R N E S :

Gary,

I'll

ta ke

I would

fee 1

comfor table

--

care of that.

THE C O U R T :

Do you want to have sentencing

i
i

today

or

come b a c k

in a week?

THE D E F E N D A N T :
you,

Your

Can I

ex.plain

something to

Honor?
MR. B A R N E S :

No .

09095
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THE

DEFENDANT:

THE

COURT:

MR.

BRICKEY:

3-25-96

I'm

on S S I , on

limited

funds.

with that

today,
THE

request

Your

COURT:

Okay.
I would

like to go

Honor.
All

right.

in the way of sentencing,

the d e f e n d a n t
MR.
the d e f e n d a n t

What do you
and then I'll

let

-BRICKEY:

Specifically,

to be ordered

following

individuals

Chandler,

Kurt

and though

ahead

I would

like

to stay away from

that testified:

the

Norman

G a l e , Henry V e l a s c o , Sherry

Reeves

he was not present:, Russell Grieder

Grieder,

as well

also ask

that

any m e m b e r s

of

the defendant

150 or are y o u
MR.

And

be advised

the Fifth District

County A t t o r n e y ' s
THE

as Sheldon Barney.

or

I would

to not

follow

Court or the

Iron

Office.

COURT:

All right.

requesting
BRICKEY:

Standard

more than

Standard

fine

of

that?

fine of 150

would

be app ro P r i a t e , Your H o n o r .
THE

COURT:

All

ri ght .

Ma' am, w ho are

you 7
VOICE:
THE

I' m his mo ther •

COURT:

Okay .

Go ahead an d have

a

C0094
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seat.

We don ' t need y our pa rt i c ipat ion.
VOICE:

on,

Your H o n o r
THE

to get

Well , ther e's a lot cf iy ing g oing

1

fine.

here.

be

S p ainhower

very m u c h

money,

reduce d at least
THE

j

I concur wi th M r . j

wit h the

except ion of

i s on disability.
and I would ask

the

He doe s not

that the f ine

to half .

COURT:

Anythi r.g else?
Just one moment, Yo ur

MR . BRICKEY:

M ay I approach ., cour.sel?

Honor .

THE

COURT:

Sure .
Your Honor,

MR . B R I C K E Y :
Spainhower

w a s booked

Correctional
th e

amount

in q u e s t i o n

b o o king

much c o m p ared
THE

into t he Iron

when Mr •

!

Coun ty

I

he ha d $2,4 01 on hi s p e r s o n .

F acility,

I have

that

you

Ok ay .

Your Honor,

recommendation

Mr .

I don't want

Have a seat.

COURT:

in c o n t e m p t

Brickey's

J

•

MR . B A R N E S :

earn

3-25-96

s1ip

i

rece ipt for that

when he was booked.

for
$150

that

is not

j

to 2,401.

DEFENDANT:

We 11, may I ma ke a

i
i

statement ?
THE
attorney

COURT:

Go

ahe ad and

talk to y o u r

for aL m i n u t e , and then he'll be your

spokesperson.

COO"
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THE D E F E N D A N T :
loaned

me.

Okay,

serve

I'm

adequately.
Fine

going

90 days

jail

All right.
to suspend,

Y o u don't

at 10:30

that

The term
harass

any of

the

sentence prepared
and then
stated

list

attorney

is as

you don't have

to

probation

have to do any jail time.
on or before April 29th

for

day.

of probation

is to not follow

-- let's put this

of the individuals

at W a l - M a r t

or

in a formal

by the county attorney's

the names

employed

Sentence

as long as you do

of $75 to be paid

review

That's money my parents

sir?

THE C O U R T :
follows:

3-25-96

office
that

and the court and

you

county

personnel.
MR. B R I C K E Y :

Thank y o u .

THE D E F E N D A N T :

Your H o n o r , may I make a

statement?
THE
order.

I've

disability.
the order

COURT:
gone

MR.

light

Probably

to stay

We're done.

away

BARNES:

the

on the fine because of

the most significant part

your
is

from p e o p l e .
Thank you, Your Honor.

THE D E F E N D A N T :
writing,

That's

Could

I get that

in

sir?
THE C O U R T :

Yeah.

We'll give you a

00092
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written

copy of

3-25-96

it after Mr. Brickey has typed

it

up .
THE D E F E N D A N T :
THE C O U R T :

Okay.

Okay.

(Thereupon, the matter
was

concluded.)
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-IRON CNTY COURT

IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE CF UTAH v s . GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER
CASE NUMEER 9 5 1 5 0 1 0 8 4

C i t y Misdemeanor

June 04,

199?

CHARGES
Charge 1 - RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: March 25, 1956 Not: Guilty
Discosition: March 25, 1996 Guilty Plea
PARTIES
Plaintiff - STATS OF UTAH
Represented by: SCOTT M. BURNS
Represented by: DAVID R. ERICKEY
Defendant - GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER
73 SOUTH 2 00 WEST
CEDAR CITY, UT 8 4720
Represented by: D BRUCE OLIVER
Payor - EASY DCES IT BAIL BONDS
180 N 230 E #105
ST GEORGE, UT 3 4 7 7 0
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
D e f e n d a n t Narre: GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER
O f f e n s e t r a c k i n g n u m b e r : 6749355
D a t e o f B i r t h : J a n u a r y 0 7 , 1961
S o c i a l S e c u r i t y Number:
Law E n f o r c e m e n t A g e n c y : CEDAR CITY POLICE
P r o s e c u t i n g A g e n c y : IRON COUNTY
Agency C a s e N u m b e r :
C i t a t i o n Number; 10388
A r r e s t D a t e : N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 1995
v i o l a t i o n D a t e : N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 1995
ACCOUNT SUMMARY

TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

145.00
0.00
75,00
70.00

PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted:
Forfeited:
Exonerated:
Balance:

300,00
0.00
300.00
0.00

00389
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Case No: 951501034
Date:
Jun. 04, 1997

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

145.00
0.00
75.00
70.00

NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety
Posted By: Easy Does It Bail Bonds
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
3 0 0.0 0
Balance:
0,00
CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
11-24-95 Case Filed:
11-24-95 Judge EVES assigned,
cor^r.
11-24-95 Arraignment schcdulea on November 2*, 1995 rt 02:00 PM in Roo^ 1
ditn Judge BRAITHWAITE.
cvi
* * * ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - ARRAIGNMENT
HEARING
11-2 4-95 ARR 11-24-95 0205P DEPENDANT PRESENT - DEFENDANT PLEADS NOT
c<w
11-24-95
GUILTY - TO BE SET FOR TRIAL ON FEBRUARY 12, 1995 0200P
cwl
11-24-95 Notice of Setting
cwl
11-24-95 Bench Trial scheduled on February 12, 1996 at 02:00 PM in Room 1
with Judge BRAITHWAITE.
cwl
11-28-95 Bond Posted
Non-Monetary Bond:
300.00
p%d
Note: FILED: UNDERTAKING OF BAIL
11-28-95 Bend Account created
Total Due;
J00.00
y\^
01-23-96 {Schedule Hearing/ scheduled on January 24, 1996 at 01:15 PM in
Room 1 with Judge BRAITHWAITE.
pki
01-24-96 HRG: 012496 01:23 DEFENDANT IS PRESENT. J.RTB ASKS THE
pKd
01-24-96
DEFENDANT FINANCIAL QUESTIONS AND APPOINTS THE PUBLIC
pkd
01-24-96
DEFENDER.
pkd
01-24-96 **C.?KD PHONED KAREEN AT JIM PARK'S OFFICE AND NOTIFIED THEM
pkd
01-24-96
OF THE APPOINTMENT AND OF TRIAL DATE, KAREEN STATED NOT TO
pkd
Cl-24-96
SEND NOTICE ON THIS CASE.
pxd
02-20-96 FILED: INFORMATION
pkd
02-20-96 Notice of Setting
laj
02-21-96 ***DAVID BRiCKEY PHONED TODAY, STATED HE SENT A MOTION TO CONT. laj
02-21-96
TO THE OFFICE ON FRIDAY. CLK LAJ INFORMED HIM SHE COULD NOT iaj
02-21-96
FIND MOTION AND TO PLEASE FAX A COPY, HE STATED HE WOULD.
laj
02-21-96 Notice of Setting
laj
02-21-96 Bench Trial scheduled on March 25, 1996 at 01:30 PM in Room 1

00388
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Case No: 951501084
Date:
J u n . 04 f 1997
03-20-96
03-20-96
03-20-96
03-20-96
03-20-96
03-21-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-9 6
03-2 5-9 6
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-56
0 3-2 5-9 6
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-2 5-9 6
03-25-96
03-2 5-9 6
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-25-96
03-27-96
04-01-96
04-01-96
04-05-9 5
04-09-95
04-09-96
04-18-96
04-18-96

with Judge BRAITHWAITE.
la:
PILED: RETURN OF SERVICE AND SUBPOENA (RUSSELL T, GRIEDER)
tac
(KURT GALE)
tac
(HENRY VELASCO)
tac
(NORMAN CHANDLER)
tac
(SHERRY REEVES)
tac
FILED; RETURN OF SERVICE ON SUBPOENA (SHELDON BARNEY)
pbr,
Fine Account craated
Total Due:
145.00
pbn
TRL: 032596
01:46 DEFENDANT IS PRESENT. MR. BRICKEY AND
pcH
MR. BARNES ARE PRESENT. 1:43 MR. CHANDLER IS SWCRN AND
pc.
TESTIFIES. 1:52 MR. BARNES CRCSS EXAMINES THE WITNESS
pel
1:53 MR. BRICKEY RE-DIRECTS WITNESS. 1:54 SHERRY REEVES TAKESpdl
THE STAND. 1:55 MR. BARNES CRCSS EXAMINE?. 2:00 HENRY
pdl
VELASCO TAKES THE STAND. 2:05 KURT GALE TAKES THE STAND
pd2:08 MR. BARNES CROSS EXAMINES THE WITNESS. 2:09 SHELDON
pdl
3ARNEY TAKES THE STAND (ALL WITNESSES WERE S\<JC?^ BEFORE TRIAL pel
BEGAN) 2:11 MR. BARNES CROSS EXAMINES WITNESS. 2:12 MR.
pal
SPAINHCWER IS SWORN AND TESTIFIES. 2:16 MR, BRICKEY CRCSS
pdl
EXAMINES THE WITNESS- J.RT3 SUSTAINS OBJECTION, CASE IS TO pdl
GO FORWARD, J.RIB FINDS THE DEFENDANT GUILTY. J.RT3 ORDERS pd^
THE DEFENDANT $150.00 FINE, NO CONTACT ORDER. MR. BRICKEY
pd^
GIVES RECOMMENDATIONS TO J.RT3, MR. BARNES CONCURS WITH MR. pd.
BRICKEY WITH EXCEPTION TO THE FINE AMOUNT,
pal
J.RTB SUSPENDS 90 DAYS JAIL, 75.00 DOLLARS BY 4/29/96 5 10:30 pdl
TERMS OF FR03ATION: DO NOT FOLLOW, HARASS WAL-MART, 5TH
pd~
DISTRICT COURT, AND IRON COUNTY PERSONNEL.
pal
Sentence:
pdl
Review Hearing scheduled on April 29, 1996 at 10:20 AM in Rcorr 1
with Judge BRAITHWAITE.
"
pdl
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present
pal
ATD: BARNES, KEITH
PRO: 3URNS, SCOTT M
pdl
Tape: 032596
Count: 01:46
pdl
Jldge: ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE
pdl
Chrg: RETAIL THEFT
Pleat Not Guilty Find: Guilty Pleapdi
Fine Amount:
150.00
Suspended:
75.00
pdl
Jail:
0 to 90
Suspended: SO
pdl
Fines and assessments entered: FN
55.56 pdl
SL
19.44 pdl
Total fines and assessments .:
75.00 pdl
REV
scheduled for 04/29/95 at 1030 A in room 1 with RTBpdl
Bond Exonerated
-300.00
caw
FILED; JUDGMENT, SENTENCE; STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, AND tac
ORDER OF PROBATION
tac
J.RTB AUTHORIZES COMMUNITY SERVICE.
pbxti
FILED; LETTER FROM DEFENDANT TO J.RTB
pkd
***PER J.RTB:
"AFPROVED-COMMUNITY SERVICE".
pkd
FILED; LETTER FROM LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
tac
REQUESTING A TRANSCRIPT FOR THE DEFENDANT WHO IS INDI- tac

Page 3
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Date:
Jun. 04, 1997
04-18-96
GENT. (JUDGE BRAITHWAITE ORDERS THE TRANSCRIFT TO BE
tac
04-13-96
ORDERED.)
tac
04-18-96
***KAREN L. OWEN FROM THE LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH tac
04-18-96
DISABILITIES REQUESTED THAT LAURIE WEB3 TRANSCRIBE
tac
04-18-96
THE HEARING
tac
04-18-9 6 DEFENDANT PHONED AND STATED HE IS WORKING ON COMMUNITY SERVICE Zd'«
04-18-96
HOURS
Cau
04-22-9 6 FILED: COMMUNITY SERVICE REFERRAL (15 HOURS @ $5.00 PER HOUR
tac
04-22-96
FOR A TOTAL OF $75.00 CREDIT)
tac
04-24-96 Fine
Payment Received:
0.0C
tac
Credit Received:
75,00
Note: 15 HRS• @ $5/HR, = $75 CREDIT
04-24-96
15 HRS. § $5/HR* - $75 CREDIT
04-29-96 REVIEW HEARING: TAPE 042996 (1050) DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT,
kcl
04-2 9-9 6
FINS IS PAID IN FULL. CASE IS ORDERED CLOSED,
^pl
04-29-96 Entered case disposition of: Closed
<ci
05-06-9 6 FILED; NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL (JAMES PARK)
tkc
05-13-96 ELIZABETH VANFLEET REQUESTED TAPE FROM C3-25-96 TO TRANSCRIBE
cav.
05-13-9 6 BACKUP TAPS MAILED TO ELIZZA3ETH VANFLEET
ca>.
Qo-20-96 FILED: TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 25, 1996
tac
0 6-2 0-9 6 FILED: FAXED COPY OF LETTER MAILED TO ELIZABETH VAN FLEET FOR tac
06-2 0-9 6
TRANSCRIPT PREPARATION. C.TAC COULD NOT LOCATE THE
tac
0 6-2 0-9 6
ORIGINAL LETTER SO ELIZABETH VAN FLEET FAXED A COPY OF tac
06-2 0-9 6
THE LETTER THAT WAS MAILED TO HER WITH THE TAPS, A
Z?xz
06-20-96
COPY OF THIS FAXED LETTER WAS MAILED TO DAVID BRICKEY
t«<~
06-20-96
FOR PAYMENT OF THE TRANSCRIPT.
tac
06-2 6-96 FILED: FAXED COPY OF LETTER FROM ELIZABETH VAN FLEET TO THE
tac
05-2 6-96
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WITH ATTACHED BILL FOR TRANtac
06-26-96
SCRIPT
tac
07-18-96 JUDGE BRAITHWAITE TALKED WITH C.TAC REGARDING THIS CASE AND
tac
07-18-96
THE TRANSCRIPT, JUDGE WANTS THIS CASE SCHEDULED FOR A
tac
07-18-96
HEARING ON JULY 30, 1996 AT 1:30 P.M.
tac
07-13-96 Notice of Setting
tec
07-25-95 ELIZABETH VANFLEET PHONED AND STATED THE STATE OF UTAH HAS
caw
07-25-9 6
ALREADY PAID HER FOR THE TRANSCRIPT SHE PREPARED
caw
07-26-96 {Schedule Hearing} scheduled on July 30, 1996 at 01:32 PM in
Room 1 with Judge BRAITHWAITE•
laj
07-30-96 HRG: 144PM- THE DEFENDANT AND ATP DAVID BRICKEY ARE PRESENT.
I3I
07-30-96
THE COURT AUTHORIZES TWO COPIES MADE OF THE TRANSCRIPT, ONE ljl
07-30-96
TO BE SENT TO THE DEFENDANT THE OTHER TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY,ljl
07-30-96 FILED: LETTER FROM KAREN OWEN REQUESTING A TRANSCRIPT ON THE
1^1
07-30-96
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT
1^1
07-30-96 FILED; UTAH RULE 77-32-5
111
07-31-96 ***COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT MAILED TO DAVID BRICKEY AND THE
la}
07-31-96
DEFENDANT ON THIS DATE
laj
03-21-97 FILED? STATE'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND BENCH WARRANTpkd
03-21-97 FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY PETERSEN
okd
03-21-97 REC'D: BENCH WARRANT
bkd

Page 4
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Case Nc: 951501084
Date:
Jun. 04, 1997
03-21-97
03-25-97
03-25-97
03-25-97
04-01-97

REC'D: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
pKd
FILED: ORDER OF RECUSAL (SIGNED J.RTB 3/25/97)
pkd
**P£R J.RTB: SEND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND BENCH WARRANT TO
pkd
J.JPE
pkd
Order to Show Cause scheduled on May 06, 1997 at 01:30 ?M m
DISTRICT COURT with Judge EVES.
mem
04-03-97 Warrant ordered on: April 03, 1997 Warrant: Num: 97C000245 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
1000,00
04-03-97 Warrant issued on: April 03, 1997 Warrant Num: 970000245 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
1000.00
Judge: J. PKILI? EVES
Issue reason: The defendant: failed to comply with the terms
of probations as alleged in the Order to Shew Cause.
04-03-97 Case disposition removed
tac
04-03-97 Added WARRANT FEE
to charge list.
tac
04-03-97 THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WILL BE SUBMITTING A NEW ORDER TO tac
04-03-97
SHOW CAUSE
tac
04-03-97 ISSUED: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (SIGNED BY J.J?E ON 4-1-97)
ZuC
04-09-97 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL, ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA, DEMAND ta<04-09-97
FOR JURY TRIAL
tac
04-09-97 FILED: REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
tac
OV-09-97 FILED: REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
tac
04-15-97 Filed: Return of Service on Order to Show Cause {Gary
Spainhower)
ci:.dy:
05-05-97 Filed: STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCCVZRi
cir.dyr
05-05-97 Order to Show Cause scheduled on May 06, 1997 at 01:30 PM in
DISTRICT COURT With Judge EVES.
maxmer:
05-05-97 Order to Shew Cause Cancelled scheduled for: 5/5/97
05-06-97 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause
maxirej
PRESENT
Prosecutor: DAVID R. 3RICKSY
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): D BRUCE OLIVER
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 7, 1961
Video
Tape Number:
97035
Clerk:
maxinem

__
Tape Count: 2:05pm

CHARGES
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/25/1996 Guilty Plea
HEARING

0008^
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Case No: 951501084
Date:
Jun. 04, 1997

The defendant is advised of the charges, the possible penalties,
and his rights.
Mr. Spainhower denies the allegations contained in the Affidavit
for Order to Show Cause,
T m s matter is set for an evidentiary hearing on either June 6,
199"\ at 1:30 p.m. or June 10, 1997, at 1:30 p.m. Mr. Oliver will
contact tie Court within two days to indicate which day ne prefers.
05-06-97 Warrant recalled on: May 06, 1997 Warrant nam: 970000245
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
bocKed.
05-13-97 Order to Show Cause scheduled on June 10, 1997 at 09:00 AM in
DISTRICT COURT with Judge EVES.
maxiner,
Order to Show Cause ~ Evidentiary Hearing
05-27-97 Notice - NOTICE for Case 951501084 ID 5952
ipaxinem
Evidentiary Hearing is scheduled.
Date: 06/10/1997
Tine: 09:00 a.m.
Location: DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
68 SOUTH 100 EAST
PAROWAN, UT 847 61
Order to Show Cause - Evidentiary Hearing
05-27-97 Evidentiary Hearing scheduled on June 10, 1997 at 09:00 AM in
PISTRICT COURT with Judge EVES,
05-27-97 Evidentiary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 6/10/97
Notice did not print

rwaxin«r
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ADDENDUM F

DAVID R. BRICKEY - USB #6188
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

;)

STATE'S MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
THE DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED
BENCH PROBATION

)
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 951501084

GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney David
R. Brickey, and respectfully submits a Memorandum Supporting The Defendant's Continued Bench
Probation. The State of Utah asserts that the Defendant's bench probationary period should continue
based on current State Statute, Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (11) (b) and on the basis of State v.
Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995).
FACTS
(1)

On or about November 15, 1995, in Iron County, State of Utah, the Defendant

concealed or transferred or caused to be carried away merchandise at Wal-Mart, in Cedar City. Utah.
(2)

On March 25,1996. the Defendant and his court appointed counsel appeared before

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite and a trial was conducted.

00381

(3)

As a result of the above referenced trial the Defendant was found guilty of Retail

Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to ninety (90) days jail and fined $1,000.
The Court stayed his sentence and placed him on a one (1) year term of bench probation. The terms
of probation were as follows: pay a $75.00 fine by April 29, 1996, and a requirement that the
Defendant not harass, intimidate, threaten, or provoke a particular witness, Ms. Sherri Reeves.
(4)

On or about March 26, 1996, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite signed and executed a

Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation based on the above
conviction.
(5)

On or about April 1, 1996, the District Court Clerk by and through Deputy District

Court Clerk, Tamara A. Carter, entered the above listed Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of
Sentence, and Order of Probation.
(6)

On or about February 28, 1997, the State of Utah alleges that Gary Wayne

Spainhower approached Ms. Sherri Reeves and did make threatening comments to her in violation
of his bench probation.
(7)

On or about March 21, 1997, the State of Utah through the Iron County Attorneys

Office prepared a State's Motion for Order to Show Cause and Bench Warrant and provided the
same to Fifth District Court Judge Robert T. Braithwaite. Attached to the State's Motion for Order
to Show Cause and Bench Warrant was an Affidavit signed by Cedar City Police Sergeant Terry
Petersen, also dated March 21, 1997.
(8)

On or about March 25, 1997, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite executed an Order of

Recusal on the above matter and assigned it to Judge J. Philip Eves for further proceedings.
(9)

On or about March 25, 1997, Judge J. Philip Eves executed a Bench Warrant in the
-2-
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amount of $1,000.00.
(10)

On or about March 26, 1997, the Iron County Attorneys Office was contacted by

Judge J. Philip Eves Clerk, Maxine Munson, and requested that a new "Order to Show Cause"
Pleading be prepared showing a Parowan address and Judge J. Philip Eves name for future hearings.
(11)

On or about April 1, 1997, Judge J. Philip Eves executed and signed an Order to

Show Cause indicating Defendant should appear for an initial arraignment on May 6, 1997, at 1:30
p.m., in Parowan, Utah.
(12)

On May 6, 1997, in Parowan, Utah, the Defendant appeared with counsel and denied

the allegations set forth in the affidavit signed by Sergeant Terry Petersen and requested an
Evidentiary Hearing. An Evidentiary Hearing date was set for June 10, 1997. (This allowed the
Defendant Thirty-five (35) days to prepare for the hearing.)
(13)

On June 10, 1997, the State of Utah appeared, along with the Defendant and his

counsel in Parowan, Utah, and an Evidentiary Hearing was conducted. The State of Utah presented
evidence through the form of witness Sherri Reeves as to the allegations of events that occurred on
February 28,1997. At the conclusion of the State's evidence the Defendant's attorney requested a
dismissal of the matter claiming that jurisdiction over his client had lapsed. The State of Utah
requested at that time an opportunity to prepare a Memorandum supporting the position that
probation should continue. The Court imposed a deadline of July 1, 1997, for the State to prepare
a Memorandum supporting that position, and the Defendant's response is expected by July 11,1997.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
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ISSUE
Whether Defendant's bench probationary period can be extended
beyond March 24, 1997? Stated another way, did the State properly
initiate revocation proceedings prior to the Defendant's probationary
period expiring?
The State of Utah asserts that the Fifth District Court has the authority to extend the
Defendant's probation because the filing of the State's Order to Show Cause on March 21, 1997, is
in accordance with the provisions of UCA § 77-18-1(1 l)(b), and in particular, because the Defendant
was given proper notice of the hearing. Defendant argues that State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
stands for the proposition that his probation has expired and thus the court has lost the authority to
extend his probationary period beyond March 24, 1997.
The State of Utah asserts that the issues raised in State v. Rawlings are different and
distinguishable from those that are raised in State of Utah v. Gary Wayne Spainhower. Specifically,
in the matter of Rawlings. the Court stated that "even though revocation proceedings were
commenced well before the expiration of probation, because the plaintiff was not given notice of the
revocation proceedings before the probation period expired, the Court held that the trial Court lacked
the authority to revoke the [Defendant's] probation and his petition for Habeas Corpus was granted."
Id. at 1068 (quoting Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990)). In Rawlings. the Utah Court of
Appeals ruled that a trial Court may retain jurisdiction over a probationer after the probation period
expires for the purposes of extension proceedings if the proceedings are properly initiated before the
probation expires. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071. Additionally, the Rawlings decision
requires that the probationer be given "proper notice." Quoting from the ruling, "proper notice"
means, "informing a probationer of the issues which will be addressed at the extension hearing and
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giving the probationer adequate time to address them". Id
In Rawlings. the Defendant was not given proper notice of the probation extension hearing
before the probation period expired and a subsequent meeting with the trial Judge did not constitute
a knowing waiver of this due process right, therefore, the trial court lacked the authority necessary
to extend Defendant's probation and the Defendant's previous extensions were terminated and his
probation expired. Id.
Judge Moylin, wrote in State of Maryland v. Jerrv L. Wilson. 664 A.2d 1, the use of
arguments based on legal authority derived from just use of key notes can be very precarious. Judge
Moylin states that using parts and bits of previous cases to establish stare decisis is not sound juris
prudence. Rather Judge Moylin believes that"... a looking at the entirety of the ruling must be made
so that the standing of the Court intended is followed." Id. at

. Specifically, Judge Moylin wrote:

In looking to the case law as a source of legal authority, there seems
to be an almost epidemic trend among lawyers generally—civil and
criminal, on the prosecution side and on the defense side of the trial
table alike, and even among some Judges-to forget the most
elemental ABC's first-semester, first-year Legal Method. Everything
said by a Judge or by a Court is not of equal weight. Were the three
cases that we are about to examine offering us three thoroughly
considered holdings, their authority would stand on undeniable
bedrock. Were they three well considered, well researched, and well
analyzed instances of even deliberate and conscious dicta, they would
still be standing on firm, persuasive ground. If, on further
examination, however, they turn out to be no more than three
careless, casual, and passing instances of the most obiter of dicta,
they should represent no more to us than the glib blandishments of a
snake oil salesman, no matter who wrote them.
The State of Utah sites Judge Moylin's reference for the purposes of pointing out that the
decision reached in State v. Rawlings was based on case law that was present and pertinent to the
facts of 1985. The facts that are relevant and pertinent to Mr. Spainhower are as follows. In 1989,
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during the general session of the Utah Legislature, a new portion to UCA § 77-18-1 was entered and
passed into law.
Specifically, the paragraph that appears as UCA § 77-18-1 (ll)(b): stating, 'The running
of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a
violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
a warrant by the court." Applying such language and it's plain meaning to the facts at hand
establishes that the State of Utah filed a probationary violation report with the Court alleging a
violation of the terms and conditions of the Defendant's probation prior to March 24, 1997.
Specifically, the Iron County Attorney's Office filed said violation report on March 21, 1997.
By filing the probationary violation report of March 21,1997, the State of Utah may now rely
on UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b) as a basis for tolling Mr. Spainhower's probation and justifies an
extension if the court finds that the Defendant did violate the terms of his probation.
Of historical significance is the footnote that appears in State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah
1988). In Green the Utah Supreme Court is asked to consider the extension of a Defendant's
probation. The Court points out that it's decision does not specifically consider whether "...the
revocation proceedings in this case were not initiated until after the statutory probation term had
expired, we need no reach the issued of the retention of jurisdiction when proceedings have been
initiated but not completed within the eighteen-month term." Id at 465, fh 3. Within a year of the
Green decision, the Utah legislature enacted UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b). [Originally enumerated as
UCA § 77-18-1 (8)(b).] The effect of UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b) addresses specifically the question the
court raise in Green at footnote 3.
Finally, the state can further rely on the fact that a Warrant of Arrest was signed on March
-6-
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25, 1997, by Judge J. Philip Eves. This warrant is issued on the last day of the Defendant's one year
probation based on the original execution date of the Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of
Sentence and Order of Probation. Judge Robert T. Braithwaite signed that Judgement on March 26,
1996, and upon it's entering on April 1, 1996, the Judgement date was set. Therefore, the State
would argue that the signing of the Warrant of Arrest complies with the final means of tolling the
Defendant's probation as set forth in UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b).
Further distinguishable from Rawlings is the fact that Mr.

Spainhower, unlike Mr.

Rawlings, was provided proper notice and given adequate time to address the issues of his alleged
probation violation. In the case before the Bar, Mr. Spainhower and counsel were notified well in
advance of the Evidentiary Hearing conducted on June 10, 1997. Specifically, Defendant and his
attorney were given notice on May 6, 1997, of the upcoming Evidentiary Hearing and the nature of
the content of the Affidavit signed by Sergeant Terry Peterson. Additionally, Mr. Spainhower was
served with the Order to Show Cause on April 11, 1997. Thus, the Defendant was afforded more
than sixty (60) days to prepare for his hearing on June 10, 1997.
Referring to the analysis of Judge Moylin once again, the State asserts that the holding of
State v. Rawlings is not that the Defendant must receive notice of the probation extension hearing
before the probationary period expires, rather, that the Defendant must be given "proper notice"
before the hearing itself. "Proper notice" having been established as informing the probationer of
the issues which will be addressed at the extension hearing and giving the probationer adequate time
to address them. Id at 1071. The Defendant did have, under UCA § 77-18-1 (ll)(b) a properly
initiated probation extension proceeding and was given "proper notice" as required by Rawlings.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court deny the Defendant's
request to terminate his bench probation. The State of Utah believes that this is an appropriate result
based on UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b) and the State's filing a probation violation report prior to March
24, 1997. The final basis of the State's position is that the Defendant and his attorney were given
proper, ample and adequate notice for the Evidentiary Hearing that followed on June 10, 1997, in
accordance with Rawlings.
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of June, 1997.

DAVID R. BRICKEY
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed and faxed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing STATE'S MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED BENCH
PROBATION by first class mail, this

day of June, 1997, to the following, to wit:
Mr. D. Bruce Oliver
ATTORNEY AT LAW
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1218
FAX: (801) 595-0300

yjfainttc )f. (JULiaJry,
Secretary
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 951501084 MO

vs.

5th JUDICIAL DIST C0UR T IC><> X>- n "•

GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
Defendant.
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This matter came before the Court on August 4, 1997, for oral argument on

DEPUTv

defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard argument and took the matter under
submission. Having now reviewed the file in its entirety, including the memoranda filed by
the parties, the Court now denies the Motion to Dismiss.
In this case the defendant was charged by the State of Utah with the offense of retail
theft, a class B misdemeanor on February 20, 1996. On March 25, 1996, the case was tried
before the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, District Judge. The defendant was adjudged
guilty, and on April 1, 1996, Judge Braithwaite executed a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of
Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation. The third numbered paragraph of that
document contains the following language:
"Defendant shall not follow, intimidate, nor harass (1) Sherry Reeves, . . . "
Thereafter on March 21, 1997, the State of Utah filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and
Bench Warrant alleging that Mr. Spainhower had violated his probation by commiting the

^
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criminal offense of Retailiation Against a Witness, a third-degree felony by contacting and
intimidating Sherry Reeves. The Order to Show Cause was issued and the matter was set for
appearance before the Court on the 6th of May 1997. Thereafter D. Bruce Oliver appeared as
attorney for defendant and entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury trial. On May 6,
1997, the matter came before the Court and was set for an evidentiary hearing. The matter
next came before the Court on June 10, 1997, for an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing Mr.
Oliver made a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the case had been closed by Judge Braithwaite
on April 29, 1996, and secondly that the probation had terminated before the Order to Show
Cause and Bench Warrant in this case were signed.
The matter was then set for further briefing and on June 30, 1997, the State filed its
Memorandum supporting its argument that the matter should not be dismissed. On July 14,
1997, the defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. Oral argument
on the matter was heard on August 4, 1997.
Defendant raises two points in support of the Motion to Dismiss. First the defendant
argues that the docket in this case indicates that Judge Braithwaite terminated the defendant's
probation by closing the case.
The Court has reviewed the docket. The facts are not in material dispute. Apparently
at the time Judge Braithwaite entered his judgment in the case and placed the defendant on
probation, he stated that the probation was to continue for one year from March 25, 1996. In
the same document Judge Braithwaite scheduled the matter of the $75 fine in this case for
review on April 29, 1996, at 10:30 a.m.
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The docket reflects that upon review of the fme payment the Court noted that the fine
had been paid and the clerk entered a statement upon the docket that the case was closed.
However no order was entered that probation was terminated or that the other provisions of
probation were not to continue in full force and effect for the term established in the probation
order.
The defendant is the moving party in this case and has the burden or establishing that
his motion is well taken. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that Judge Braithwaite
intended to revoke the probation order previously entered in this case or to terminate the
probation before it had run its course. The defendant has further failed to demonstrate that the
note placed in the docket by the court clerk in any way reflects a determination by the Court to
terminate the probation. Accordingly the Motion to Dismiss on that ground is denied.
The defendant also alleges as a ground for his Motion to Dismiss that the probation in
this case terminated by operation of law before the Court issued its Order to Show Cause and
Warrant in this matter. In support of his position the defendant cites the provisions of 77-181. The defendant argues that since this was not formal probation supervised by Adult
Probation and Parole the probation period would not have been tolled by the filing of the
State's Motion for Issuance of Order to Show Cause and Bench Warrant on March 21, 1996,
but would have only been tolled once the Order to Show Cause and Bench Warrant were
actually issued by the Court.
The Court disagrees with the defendant's reading of the statute. Section 77-18-1(1 l)(b)
specifically provides:
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"The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of
a violation report with the Court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an Order to Show Cause
or a Warrant by the Court."
In this case there was filed on March 21, 1997, a violation report consisting of a
Motion by the County Attorney's Office for an order to show cause and bench warrant
supported by an Affidavit signed by a law enforcement officer and alleging that the defendant
had violated the specific provisions of his probation by commiting a new crime and by
violating a restraining provision designed to protect witnesses and other personnel specifically
named in the probation order.
Under the provisions of the statute once the Court received notification of the alleged
violation of probation, the running of Mr. Spainhower's probation term was tolled under the
specific provisions of the statute.
The provisions of this statute tolling the running of the probation period should not be
confused with the provisions of the statute or the holding of State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2nd
1063, relating to the failure to give the defendant notice when the State seeks to extend a
probation period. Extending probation and tolling the running of the probation period are not
the same. In order to extend a probation period the defendant must be given notice of the
proceedings or must waive notice. Otherwise the probation period continues as originally set.
On the other hand the filing of a violation notice with the Court, whether it comes from
Adult Probation and Parole or the County Attorney, tolls or stops the running of the probation
period. That occurred in this case on March 21st which was within the one year of probation
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-5established by the sentencing judge. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss on that ground is
likewise denied.
The County Attorney will prepare and submit for the Court's signature an order
reflecting the provisions of this Memorandum Opinion.
DATED this 21st day of August 1997.

g^s-t**—

J. PHILIP EVES, District Court Judge
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DAVE) R. BRICKEY - USB #6188
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6694
Telecopier: (435) 586-2737

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT , IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

vs.

])

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
ORDER REVOKING PROBATION.
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, AND
COMMITMENT

GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,

;)

Criminal No. 951501084

)

Judge J. Philip Eves

STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff.

Defendant.

;)
;)

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on November 17, 1997, pursuant
to an order to show cause as to why Defendant's probation should not be revoked, and the State of
Utah having appeared by and through David R. Brickey, Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney, and
the Defendant GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having appeared in person together with his
counsel of record, Bruce Oliver, and the Court first inquiring as to whether or not the Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration would be considered, and the Court having taken into consideration the
Defendant's Memorandum of Points of Authorities Supporting Reconsideration and then reviewing
the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and the Court
thereafter deciding to deny the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and calling the matter on

Q015S

for disposition based on the evidentiary hearing held on June 10, 1997, and finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation
by contacting Sherry Reeves, and the Court having thereafter heard statements from the Defendant,
his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney, and having been fully advised in the premises,
the Court now makes and enters the following orders, to wit:
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby denied.

ORDER REVOKING PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant's probation
should be and hereby is revoked.
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the previous execution of sentence that was stayed is hereby
reinstated with the following modifications, the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the
Iron County Correctional Facility, allow housing at the Utah State Prison while serving a diagnostic
evaluation in relation to criminal no. 971500209, for a term of sixty (60) days.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, GARY WAYNE
SPAINHOWER, and deliver him to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility, there to be
held under the provisions of the foregoing Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration,
Order Revoking Probation, Execution of Sentence, and Commitment.

00i

DATED this ^ / ^ d a y of November, 1997.

J.^HILIP EVES (/
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Order Revoking Probation, Execution of
Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Gary Wayne Spainhower. Criminal
No. 951501084, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
this c-^-!

day of November. 1997.

,

m

«„, s« « .•/»*

CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk
(

S E A L

)

/J//((i/ ^Ak-h

By: '- <-/l--A'-!; v\
Deputy D|strict Court Clerk
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING
MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE

vs.
Case No. 971500209FS
GARY WAYNE SPA1NHOWER,
Judge J. Philip Eves
Defendant,

Comes now the Defendant, Gary Wayne Spainhower, by and
through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, hereby submits this
memorandum of points and authorities supporting his motion to
reduce charge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are based on the statements made
within the Information, the police reports and supplemental
reports prepared by the officers involved which are filed with
this Court, the evidence and testimony of the victim taken from
case no. 951501084, and any logical inferences drawn therefrom.
These facts are for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory

and the Defendant does not concede to these facts or this factual
scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or implied.
1.

The Defendant (hereinafter "Mr. Spainhower") has been

charged by information with RETALIATION AGAINST WITNESS, a Third
Degree Felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 508,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
2.

On or about February 28, 1997, Mr. Spainhower

approached and confronted the victim in the store and told her,
"I'm going to get you for lying in Court you fat bitch."
3.

This communication was received and recorded as a

threat to commit a serious bodily injury to herself or a member
of her immediate family.
4.

Then Mr. Spainhower continued to follow her about the

store at which point she became concerned for her safety left her
groceries and proceeded directly out to her car.
5.

The victim noticed that Mr. Spainhower continued to

follow her out in the parking lot and even exited out the same
parking lot as she used.
6.

The victim indicated that Mr. Spainhower!s use of the

same parking lot exit caused her to become fearful of bodily
injury to herself or to a member of her immediate family.
7.

Mr. Spainhower caused the victim to suffer emotional

distress or a member of her immediate family to suffer emotional
distress.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CHARGE SHOULD BE REDUCED TO STALKING OR HARASSMENT.

2

A.

Introduction.
STALKING, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106.5 (1953, as

amended), is, inter alia, a Class B Misdemeanor when:
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause
a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member
of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a
member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily
injury to himself or a member of his family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member
of his immediate family will suffer emotional
distress; and
(c) whose conduct;
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily
injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) cause emotional distress in the specific
person or a member of his immediate family.
Id.
HARASSMENT, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106 (1953, as
amended), is a Class B Misdemeanor when:
[The actor], with intent to frighten or harass another,
he communicates a written or recorded threat to commit
any violent felony.
Id.
B.

Grounds.

The Grounds for t h i s motion i s t h a t Mr. Spainhower i s
e n t i t l e d to the b e n e f i t of the l e s s o r penalty when c e r t a i n
conduct i s p r o h i b i t e d by d i f f e r e n t or c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t u t e s .
C.

Case Law—State v .

Shondel.

A defendant is entitled to be charged under a statute
carrying the lesser penalty.
(Utah 1969).

State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146

In Shondel, the Supreme Court agreed with the

3
4
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proposition advocated by the defendant "that the equal protection
of the laws requires that they affect alike all persons similarly
situated-"

Id-

Consistently, the Court reasoned:

[WJhere there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of
two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused
is entitled to the benefit of the lesser. This impels
the conclusion here that the clear, specific and lesser
penalty prescribed for the offense as a misdemeanor . .
. is the one which should be imposed. We say this
mindful of our statute which provides that the
common-law rule of strict construction of statutes is
not applicable in this state. But it is our opinion
the conclusion we have reached is in harmony with that
section's further mandate that our statutes should be
"construed according to the fair import of their terms
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice."
Id.

As a result the Shondel Court found the wrong sentence had

been imposed and remanded the matter back to the trial court so
that the proper sentence could be imposed.
The case at hand is on point with Shondel.

It is clear

and undoubtful that the conduct which has been described by the
victim and allegations made against Mr. Spainhower better
describe violation of the Stalking or Harassment provisions of
the Utah Code; not the Retaliation Against a Witness provision.
The victim in this proceeding reportedly indicated that
Mr. Spainhower had knowingly engaged in conduct that caused her
to fear bodily injury or to suffer emotional distress.
Additionally, the victim indicated that Mr. Spainhower had
communicated a threat to her that he was going to get her.

This

communication was recorded by Officer Terry Peterson.

4
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it would best serve justice
and prohibit a violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses contained within Article I, §§ 7, 11, 12, 24 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.

This would be accomplished by reducing the Charge

against Mr. Spainhower to STALKING or HARASSMENT, Class B
Misdemeanors.

The described conduct of Mr. Spainhower best

depicts conduct prohibited by either of these conflicting and
overlapping criminal offenses.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

18th

day of

June, 1997.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a
telefacsimile to (801) 586-2737 and I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
SUPPORTING MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE, postage prepaid, to: David
R. Brickey, Iron County Attorney's Office, 97 North Main, Suite
#1, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720.
Dated this

18th

day of June, 1997.

U
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Defendant, in this case, only had one encounter with the victim to support a criminal charge.
Moreover, the relationship between the parties is that of a witness against a defendant in a prior
criminal case which is exactly the intent behind the criminal offense of Retaliation Against a Witness.
The Defendant further asserts that he is entitled to a reduction to the offense of Harassment,
a Class B Misdemeanor, as set forth in Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended. The crime of Harassment requires the State of Utah to prove, among other elements, that
the Defendant "communicated a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony." There is
absolutely no evidence in this case that the Defendant communicated in writing or recorded any threat
to commit a violent felony. Again, the offense is not applicable to the underlying facts of this criminal
case.
The State of Utah respectfully requests, after oral argument, that the Court deny the
Defendant's Motion to Reduce Charge.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

2$'-

day of June, 1997.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE, by first-class mail,

02 rl
postage fully prepaid, on this

L\J ~

day of June, 1997, to the following, to wit:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM OPINION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE N

vs.

'PONI CO- ^ T

GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,
Defendant.
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This matter came before the Court on August 4, 1997, for oral argument on tae"DEPUTY
defendant's Motion to Reduce the Charges in this case. For the reasons stated hereafter the
Motion is denied.
On March 4, 1997, the State of Utah filed an Information in this Court charging the
defendant with the third-degree felony of Retaliation Against a Witness. The State alleged that
the defendant did "knowingly and intentionally communicate to a person a threat that a
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of
any act performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official
proceeding or investigation."
The defendant moves to reduce the charge to either stalking or harassment, both of
which are misdemeanors, on the theory that the conduct of the defendant, even if the State's
claims are correct, would be covered by the elements of those offenses and therefore the
defendant should be charged with the lesser offense rather than the greater.
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The Court has considered the arguments of the defendant. The Court finds that neither
the crime of stalking nor the crime of harassment applies under the facts in this case.
The offense of stalking is defined in 78-5-106.5 UCA. One of the elements is that
there be a course of conduct directed at a specific person. In this case there is no course of
conduct. There was one incident that led to the charge. Therefore the State's evidence would
fail if the charge were stalking. In addition stalking does not include the element relating to
the relationship between the defendant and the threatened person. Under retaliation against a
witness the State would have to prove that the threat was made because the person threatened
was a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation. There is no such
element in the stalking statute. It is apparent that the legislature has chosen to distinguish
between those who commit the crime of stalking, which is treated as a misdemeanor, and those
who threaten witnesses in official proceedings, which is treated as a felony. The distinction is
important and differentiates between those two charges.
The defendant also argues that the charge of harassment is the applicable charge in this
case. Harassment requires the communication of a written or recorded threat to commit any
violent felony. No such threat exists in this case. The threat was oral, not written or
recorded, and the threat was not specifically to commit a violent felony.
For the reasons stated herein above the Motion to Reduce the Charge is denied.
DATED this 21st day of August 1997.

J. PHILIP EVES, District Court Judge
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